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COURT-ORDERED COMMUNITY SERVICE IN CRIMINAL LAW:
THE CONTINUING TYRANNY OF BENEVOLENCE?*
ALAN T. HARLAND**
"The most melancholy of human reflec-
tions, perhaps, is that, on the whole, it
is a question whether the benevolence of
mankind does more harm or good. "t
INTRODUCTION One of the more widely discussed aspects of criminal
justice reform in the past decade has been the need to control or
structure the extensive discretionary power exercised by deci-
sionmakers throughout the system.' Attention has focused upon
various ways to reduce what is perceived to be unjustifiable dispar-
ity in the length of criminal sentences, and upon ways to bring
more consistency to decisions concerning whether sentences should
be served in the community or in custody.2 Along with concern
* Prepared under Grant Number 78-NI-AX-0110 from the National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S.
Department of Justice. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S.
Department of Justice.
** L.L.B. (Hons. Jurisprudence), Oxford, England, 1971, L.L.M. University of Penn-
sylvania (Criminal), 1973. The author is director of two federally funded national research
projects in the fields of community service and restitution, awarded to the Criminal Justice
Research Center, Albany, New York. My thanks to Burt Galaway and Joe Hudson for their
support and insights during the preparation of this article. My thanks also to Professor
LeRoy Lomborn who was kind enough to read and suggest improvements to earlier drafts.
t W. BAGEHOT, PHYSICS AND POLITICS (1869).
1. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCING: LAw WITHOUT ORDER (1973); see also
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND
PuNIsHMENT IN AMERICA (1971). For a most recent and comprehensive treatment of criminal
justice decisionmaking, see M. R. GoTTREDSON & D. GorrffREDsoN, DECISIONMAKING IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TowARD THE RATIONAL EXERCISE OF DISCRETION (1980). This book
presents an excellent review and critique of an extensive array of research studies into the
various decisionmaking stages of the criminal process: from the victim's decision to report a
crime, to decisions made by correctional and parole officials. It offers a rare combination of
methodological and substantive sensitivity to the issues surrounding the widespread discre-
tion that characterizes most criminal justice decisions, and it provides a dispassionate ap-
praisal of the merits of different attempts to structure and control discretion.
2. Wilkins, et al., Sentencing Guidelines: Structuring Judicial Discretion, U.S. DEP'T
JUSTICE (Feb. 1978).
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over disparity in sentence length and sentence type, an ever in-
creasing variety of sentence conditions is being advocated for use
by today's judiciary.3 Largely as a result of a recent proliferation of
federally funded initiatives, a sentencing judge is often exhorted to
direct offenders to programs offering intensive probation supervi-
sion, drug or alcohol therapy, employment counseling, restitution
services, or countless other experimental or established "sentenc-
ing alternatives."4 As any program administrator or evaluator is
aware, moreover, as the number of alternative programs increases
within a particular jurisdiction different program staffs may find
themselves competing for a judge's attention in order to procure
clients for their own particular form of intervention.
One condition of criminal court dispositions that has drawn
widespread attention recently is the practice of requiring offenders
to perform some type of unpaid work or community service, usu-
ally for governmental or nonprofit agencies. Community service
has received the approval of such prestigious organizations as the
American Bar Association,5 and it has been recognized as a pro-
posed condition of probation in a working draft of the Federal
Criminal Code Revision Act of 1979.6 In addition, community
service has received overwhelmingly favorable attention in the
popular7 and academic8 literature, and experimentation with com-
munity service has become a major funding target for federal
agencies.9
Despite the growing enthusiasm for the use of community ser-
3. Strictly speaking, most of the conditions referred to are either affixed as part of a
probation term or as requirements of suspended sentence or conditional discharge.
4. See, e.g., Nelson, Ohmart & Harlow, Promising Strategies in Probation and Parole,
U.S. DEPT JUSTICE (Nov. 1978).
5. See, e.g., Harris, Community Service by Offenders, A.B.A. BASICS PROGRAM, Wash.
D.C. (1979). During March 14-16, 1980, the Young Lawyers Division of ABA sponsored a
workshop on community service in Detroit, Michigan, funded by a grant from the National
Institute of Corrections (NIC). Id. at ii.
6. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON CraM. JUST., 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., WORKING DRAFT
ON REVISION OF TITLE 18 U.S. CODE (Comm. Print 1979).
7. See, e.g., Greenhouse, Alternative Sentencing: A Way Out?, 5 STATE LEGISLATURES
12 (1979).
8. See, e.g., Newton, Sentencing to Community Service and Restitution, 11 Ciubi. JUST.
ABSTRACTS 435 (1979); Brown, Community Service as a Condition of Probation, 41 FED.
PROBATION 7 (1977).
9. See, e.g., 43 FED. REG. 32,612 (1979) (announcing availability of funds to support
community service programs by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA));
see also note 5 supra for involvement of NIC.
[Vol. 29
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vice dispositions in the above circles, it has recently been noted
that "case law concerning the legality of requiring an offender to
perform community service as a condition of probation has not yet
been established." 10 Similarly, a recent report for the National
Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice concludes that:
"alternative sentencing seems to be in an experimental stage le-
gally. As far as can be determined to date, no litigation has con-
tested its use and there is'almost nothing in the literature dealing
with potential legal or constitutional conflict. . . ."1 Although
isolated opinions may be found in which the appellate courts have
considered the use of community service by sentencing judges, 2
and although explicit statutory authorization is becoming more
common,13 case law and legislative activity in the area remain neg-
ligible in comparison to the extensive use of the sanction in numer-
ous jurisdictions throughout the United States. In the absence of
explicit authorization, for example, individual sentencing judges
have publicized their support for and use of community service
under their broad discretionary powers to set conditions for proba-
tion or discharge.' 4 In addition, formal programs to implement and
administer community service are spreading rapidly throughout
the United States, usually under similar nonexplicit, discretionary
authority.15
This article will examine some of the assumptions underlying
the expansion of community service sentencing, in order to provide
legislators and criminal justice practitioners with a review of stat-
utes, case law, and related developments in the law, as well as to
provide a critical appraisal of some of the potential legal or consti-
tutional conflicts that community service may provoke. By way of
an organizational framework, discussion can be conveniently di-
vided into two general areas: the first of these involves considera-
tion of the basic sentencing authority of the courts to impose
10. Harris, supra note 5, at 22.
11. Beha, Carlson & Rosenblum, Sentencing to Community Service, 31 U.S. DmET Jus-
TICE (Oct. 1977) (emphasis added).
12. See, e.g., People v. Mandell, 50 A.D.2d 907, 377 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1975); see also
United States v. Chapel, 428 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1970) (work at hospital or other charitable
institution).
13. See Table 1, infra.
14. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8; see also McCarty, How One Judge Uses Alternative
Sentencing, 60 JUDICATURE 316 (1977).
15. See Harris, supra note 5; see also Beha, Carlson & Rosenblum, supra note 11.
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community service, and the second area embraces specific issues in
the implementation and administration of community service
penalties.
I. COMMUNITY SERVICE SENTENCING AUTHORITY
A. Analogous Provisions
Requiring offenders to perform some kind of work or service
as part of the penalty for their crimes is not new. The Thirteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution affords solemn rec-
ognition of a longstanding national acceptance of involuntary ser-
vitude as a punishment for crime.' 6 Similarly, uncompensated la-
bor by inmates of penal institutions, sentenced to hard labor or
put to work on chain gangs, is one of the more widely portrayed
aspects of American penal history.17 An 1891 West Virginia stat-
ute, still in force, provides that if an offender is confined for viola-
tion of a municipal ordinance, whether for failure to pay a fine for
the violation, or as part of the sentence, he may be ordered by the
court
to work on the public streets and alleys of [the] city, town or village....
And the council of such city, town or village may make proper allowance to
the marshal or sergeant to take charge of such person or persons while so at
work, and allow and pay a reasonable compensation for the services rendered,
out of the treasury of such city, town or village. 18
More recently, a 1975 California probation law provides that:
In counties or cities and counties where road camps, farms, or other public
work is available the court may place the probationer in such camps, farms,
or other public work instead of in jail ... and the court shall have the same
power to require adult probationers to work at public work. . . and supervi-
sors of the several counties are hereby authorized to provide public work and
to fix the scale of compensation of such adult probationers in their respective
counties.2
An act that in many ways captures more closely the spirit of
community service, as the concept exists today, is a 1949 Alaska
16. U.S. CoNSr. amend. XIII, § 1:
NEITHER SLAVERY NOR INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, EXCEPT AS A PUNISHMENT FOR
CRIME WHEREOF THE PARTY SHALL HAVE BEEN DULY CONVICTED, SHALL EXIST WITHIN
THE UNITED STATES, OR ANY PLACE SUBJECT TO THEIR JURISDICTION.
17. See, e.g., IVES, A HISTORY OF PENAL METHODS (1914).
18. W. VA. CODE § 62-4-16.
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1979).
[Vol. 29428
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probation law prohibiting littering in public recreational facilities
or on or from public highways.20 After declaring the offense to be a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $500, or by
imprisonment in jail for not more than one year, or by both, the
statute adds that the sentence may be suspended and that: "The
defendant may be required, as a condition of probation, to pick up
garbage and rubbish from the nearest highway, highway right-of-
way, or public recreation facility for not more than four hours a
day on each of two days. 21 Similar provisions exist in other juris-
dictions. For example, in California picking up litter may be made
a condition of probation in addition to fines. 22
The penalties for littering contain the seeds of recent develop-
ments in community service as a more generally applicable sen-
tencing provision in two important, overlapping respects. First,
although not explicitly stated, the work involved in picking up rub-
bish is presumably intended to be performed without compensa-
tion. Second, just as the task of picking up litter for the offense of
littering may obviously be considered a reparative penalty, so is
the recent growth of community service closely linked in theory
and practice to reparation or restitution by criminal offenders. 8
These concepts frequently complement each other. In many resti-
tution programs community service fulfills a secondary function by
providing an option for those offenders who cannot afford financial
reparation or whose crimes did not result in a restitutionable loss
to the victim. 24 Restitution and community service are often juxta-
posed in recent statutes, 25 and the term restitution is sometimes
used to signify both financial restitution and community service.26
In a recent Mississippi statute the terms are granted essential
equivalence under the rubric "restitution to society. 2 In Minne-
sota the expression "work in restitution" appears in the State
20. ALASKA STAT. § 11.20.590.
21. Id.
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 374b.5 (Deering 1979) (not less than four hours upon a second
littering conviction, and not less than eight hours upon a third littering conviction).
23. See generally OFENDER REsTrTurON i THEORY AND AcToN (B. Galaway & J. Hud-
son eds. 1977).
24. Id.
25. See statutes cited in column seven of Table 1, infra.
26. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(1) (West 1979) (restitution may be monetary
and nonmonetary); cf. FLORIDA YotrmFuL OF FNDER AcT, ch. 78-84 § 4(2) (1978) (restitution
in money or in kind or through public service).
27. 1Mss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-47(4) (1978).
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code,28 and the idea of a reparative relationship between the ser-
vice and the offense may also underlie a New Hampshire law re-
quiring that the service must be "of a sort that in the opinion of
the court will foster respect for those interests violated by the de-
fendant's conduct. '29
B. Community Service Sentencing Statutes
Statutes such as the New Hampshire,. Mississippi and Minne-
sota laws are among a rapidly growing body of legislation that has
been enacted in recent years, augmenting the more traditional sen-
tencing powers of the courts by making explicit statutory provision
for the use of community service as part of a criminal disposition.
Specific statutory authorization of community or public service as
a dispositional option for criminal sentencing judges now exists in
approximately one-third of the jurisdictions in the United States.
Table 1 summarizes the purposes and major provisions of these
laws, the type and amount of service authorized, and highlights
any provisions of special interest.
Although laws from only seventeen states are included in Ta-
ble 1, the variety of approaches authorizing courts to impose com-
munity service is notable.8 Proceeding down column two of the
table, for example, community service has received legislative ap-
proval as a sentence in its own right, and as a condition of sus-
pended sentence, probation, and conditional discharge. It has been
authorized in Maryland and Illinois as a condition of probation
prior to judgment,31 and in New Jersey the fact that an offender
will participate in a community service program may be considered
a mitigating factor in determining the offender's sentence. Further
reading of the second column of Table 1 shows that community
service is authorized sometimes in addition to other penalites such
as jail, fines, reparation or restitution, or, in the case of Florida,
any other punishment. At other times, service is statutorily listed
6
28. MINN. STAT. § 3.739 (SUPP. 1979).
29. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 651:2(VI-a) (1977).
30. The variety of programmatic approaches towards community service is illustrated
in a recent series of more than twenty reports describing programs around the country.
(Unpublished mimeos (1980) supplied to author by Joe Hudson and Burt Galaway, School
of Social Development, University of Minnesota, Duluth 55812).
31. Compare OR. Rnv. STAT. § 135.891 (1977) (community service as condition of pre-
trial diversion).
[Vol. 29
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in lieu of or in satisfaction of monetary obligations. 2 Similarly,
several of the statutes authorize community service for specific of-
fenses such as petty theft, shoplifting, destruction of property, and
unauthorized entry, or for classes of offenses such as misdemean-
ors, violations, or nonviolent crimes. Still other provisions apply
specifically to certain types of offenders, such as those convicted of
a particular crime for the first or second time.
In addition to the provisions examined in Table 1 authorizing
the imposition of community service, several of the statutes listed
deal with creation and administration of formal service programs;
others address ancillary questions such as liability for injury to and
by the offender performing community service work. These distinc-
tive provisions and other provisions covering such areas as type
and amount of service, will be discussed in connection with specific
issues concerning implementation and administration of commu-
nity service programs."
32. For a discussion of potential constitutional problems with statutes of this sort, see
text accompanying notes 150-57, infra.
33. See text accompanying note 132, infra.
1980]
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C. Implicit Powers Under Probation Laws
The imposition of community service sanctions by sentencing
judges and the development of community service programs have
greatly outdistanced legislative activity explicitly authorizing their
use. In the absence of such explicit authorization many judges and
programs have simply assumed comparable, 4 and arguably
broader powers,m under probation laws couched in more general
discretionary terms. The discretionary language in the Federal
Probation Act,s for example, has prompted the use of unpaid com-
munity service in several jurisdictions.7 The Act allows probation
"upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best, [pro-
vided that] the ends of justice and the best interest of the defen-
dant will be served thereby."38
Three of the most frequently encountered assumptions ad-
vanced in support of assuming power to require community service
are: a) it provides a viable alternative to incarceration, b) it is a
voluntary undertaking on the part of the offender, and c) it repre-
sents a rehabilitative experience for offenders. Similar claims have
been successfully proffered in justifying other conditions of proba-
tion that were also not specifically countenanced by statute. A re-
cent decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Commonwealth
34. See Brown, supra note 8. Judge Brown, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court, Memphis,
Tenn. notes that: "In this district, a very high percentage of those placed on probation are
required to perform work without pay." Id. at 8. Although the Federal Probation Law does
not mention community service, Judge Brown explains that: "The advantages of such a
program of work without pay appeared to me to be obvious and I could foresee no dis-
advantages.... Certainly there is plenty of public and charitable work to be done that is
not being done in every city and town in America. We recommend this program to all courts
throughout the land." Id. at 7, 9. (Emphasis added)
35. It has been observed, for example, that "with no statutory authority or limitation,
some programs, even those that are involved with community service in lieu of a fine, have
reported sentences of community service up to 1,000 hours." Beha, Carlson & Rosenblum,
supra note 11, at 34.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1974).
37. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8. The General Counsel of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts reports that "Correspondence in our files indicates that such pub-
lic service conditions have been employed in the Central District of California and the
Western District of Tennessee. In-the District of Arizona probationers performed charitable
work on the 'suggestion' of the court although such was not made an express condition of
probation." Memo of Elsie Reid to Carl Imlay, General Counsel (May 11, 1976). With the
increased public attention to community service since 1976, it is likely that service penalties
are used more widely in United States courts today.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1974).
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v. Waltone clearly demonstrates the power of the alluring notions
that a probation condition, in this case restitution, may be rehabil-
itative, consensual, and an alternative to imprisonment:
Although we have indicated that an order placing a defendant on probation
must be regarded as punishment for double-jeopardy purposes, there is, in
our view, a significant distinction between restitution required in addition to
a statutory punishment, such as imprisonment, and restitution required in
lieu of such punishment. While such an order must be strictly scrutinized in
conjunction with a primarily punitive sentence, conditions of probation,
though significant restrictions on the offender's freedom, are primarily aimed
at effecting, as a constructive alternative to imprisonment, his rehabilitation
and reintegration into society as a law-abiding citizen; courts therefore are
traditionally and properly invested with a broader measure of discretion in
fashioning conditions of probation appropriate to the circumstances of the
individual case... .o
From the viewpoint of the offender, of course, there is a further significant
distinction. In exchange for his acceptance of the probationary condition, he
is permitted to avoid imprisonment and obtain his freedom, though in a
somewhat restricted form.'
1
Whether considering restitution or community service, the avail-
able evidence casts considerable doubt upon the validity of all
three assumptions, and makes the propriety of proceeding without
explicit statutory approval extremely dubious.
1. Community Service as an Alternative to Incarceration
Community service in the United States is frequently referred to
as an "alternative" sentencing concept. 2 Occasionally the use of
the word "alternative" is quite general, meaning no more than that
community service is an option available to sentencing judges in
addition to all the more traditional sanctions of fine, probation,
and incarceration. 3 Perhaps due to the widely recognized phenom-
enon of "overselling" new ideas in criminal justice," community
service is often optimistically portrayed as a sentence that is used
39. 397 A.2d 1179 (Pa. 1979).
40. Id. at 1184.
41. Id. at n.15.
42. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 8; see also McCarty, supra note 14.
43. See, e.g., Keldgord, Community Restitution Comes To Arizona, in OENDER REsM-
TUTION IN THEORY AND ACTION, supra note 23, at 161.
44. See, e.g., Weiss, Evaluation Research in the Political Context, in HANDBOOK OF
EVALUATION REsEARCH 13 (Struening & Guttentag, eds. 1975). "Because of the political
processes of persuasion and negotiation required to get a program enacted, inflated promises
are made in the guise of program goals.... Because statements of goals are designed to
secure support for programs, they set extravagant levels of expectation." Id. at 16.
19801
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widely for offenders who would otherwise have been incarcerated.
The result has been that community service is commonly perceived
in the media and in academic literature as an alternative to
incarceration.
A headline in a recent Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration (LEAA) newsletter, for example, declared that: "Offenders
Avoid Imprisonment by 'Volunteer' Work. 45 The article summa-
rized a review of selected community service programs. The same
newsletter announced the first large scale federal funding initiative
in the area of community service sentencing, by stating that one of
the goals of the LEAA program was: "to create an innovative alter-
native to the typical correctional processing of selected offend-
ers .... The criminal justice system is expected to benefit from
1146the lowered costs of non-incarceration ... .
The image of community service as an alternative to incarcer-
ation is also fostered by criminal justice practitioners. A San Fran-
cisco judge, for example, in explaining how he uses "alternative
sentencing," noted that one of the benefits was: "It saves taxpayers
the cost of food, clothing, bedding, cleaning and medical services at
the county jail, where the daily cost of maintaining a prisoner is
about $27.'4 Similarly, an Arizona probation chief states that:
"The community service restitution program as operated by the
Pima County Adult'Probation Department is a sentencing alterna-
tive available to the courts, and is a viable alternative to incarcera-
tion, the imposition of a fine, or the imposition of monetary
restitution."'48
In the academic literature on community service, one of the
more sweeping assertions is contained in a recent article by
Newton:
Sentencing to community service or restitution provides an alternative to im-
prisonment which is positive from every point of view: It avoids the destruc-
tiveness of imprisonment, it is less costly than imprisonment, it holds the
possibility of helping the offender, and it helps compensate the victim of
crime for his loss.4"
45. 7 LEAA Newsletter 1, 9 (No. 5, 1978).
46. 43 FED. REG., supra note 9, at 32, 661.
47. McCarty, supra note 14, at 317.
48. Keldgord, supra note 43, at 166.
49. Newton, supra note 8, at 437. Community service may be in many instances anti-
thetical to the victim's interest in financial compensation. For example, if unpaid commu-
nity service is thought to be a highly desirable sanction because of its therapeutic benefit to
[Vol. 29
COMMUNITY SERV. IN CRIM. LAW
In general, community service when studied is seen as an op-
tion that may be a positive alternative to incarceration.50 But to
test the validity of claims that community service is a viable alter-
native to incarceration, one would examine a body of empirical re-
search demonstrating whether or not offenders sentenced to per-
form a service would have been incarcerated in the absence of the
service option. Unfortunately, no such body of research is available
in the United States. Based upon inferences drawn from a variety
of less direct sources, however, it is possible to conclude with con-
siderable assurance that the offender sentenced to community ser-
vice does not typically avoid incarceration thereby: instead the ser-
vice is imposed in addition to his normal penalty, or, at best, in
lieu of monetary sanctions.
a. Limitations on Program Eligibility Examination of the
programs and procedures upon which many of the "alternative-to-
incarceration" pronouncements are based, suggests strongly that
even within those programs it is likely to be the rare exception
rather than the rule that an offender would have been incarcerated
without the program's intervention. The text accompanying the
LEAA headline that "Offenders Avoid Imprisonment by 'Volun-
teer' Work, '51 for example, is based upon a report that is largely
devoted to explaining the need to monitor programs, and to offer-
ing ways in which to evaluate programs in order to discover
whether they truly operate as alternatives to incarceration.52 In-
deed, in their cautious but optimistic report the authors note ex-
plicitly that:
[J]udges have not shown consistent interest in such alternatives where seri-
ous and/or felony charges are involved.... The record of community service
programs to date in the United States indicates that they have been used
primarily for cases that might otherwise be handled by fine or probation,
rather than for cases in which a jail sentence is the traditional alternative. In
some situations this is an explicit facet of the program; elsewhere, it is simply
a characteristic of the caseload .... Some programs were set up as an avenue
to "work off"' fines; even those with a broader mandate show a high propor-
the offender, criminal justice practitioners may be reluctant to risk jeopardizing that benefit
by adding an extra financial burden that might be more difficult to shoulder.
50. See, e.g., Galaway, The Use of Restitution, 23 CRwI AND DELINQUENCY 57, 64
(1977).
51. 7 LEAA Newsletter, supra note 44.
52. Beha, Carlson & Rosenblum, supra note 11, at ch. 4.
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tion of their caseload convicted of code violations and parking infractions
rather than misdemeanors.5 3
The'tendency of community service programs to deal predomi-
nantly or exclusively with offenders who are extremely unlikely to
be incarcerated is reinforced by examination of a large majority of
the programs that have been evaluated.54 Where formal eligibility
criteria exist for admission to the program, they most commonly
relate to those convicted of minor property offenses or others for
whom some form of community based disposition might be ex-
pected. 5 Similarly, a review of the community service statutes in
Table 1 does little to bolster the belief that community service is
an alternative to incarceration. In none of the statutes listed is
community service explicitly to be allowed as a complete alterna-
tive to incarceration. It certainly seems likely that such a result is
not generally intended in those statutes in which service penalties
are provided for petty thefts and other misdemeanors or violations.
b. Community Service and Punishment Theory One indica-
tion of the ways in which community service might be expected to
develop in the United States may be inferred from an assessment
of its relative correlation to different theories of punishment. From
a deterrence perspective, for example, although it can be argued
that community service may be as effective a deterrent or a more
effective deterrent than probation or fines, it would be consider-
ably more difficult to dispute that it is not less effective than im-
prisonment. Similarly, if the supervision involved in community
service makes it a more incapacitative measure than fines or pro-
bation, it nevertheless offers less of a guarantee of societal protec-
tion than does total confinement.
Under utilitarian sentencing theories, it is only from a rehabil-
itative perspective that there is much question about the relative
standing of community service and confinement. Advocates of
community service frequently point to criticisms of the link be-
tween incarceration and rehabilitation when pressing community
service as an alternative with greater potential.56 In a professional
53. Id. at 25.
54. See generally Harris, note 5 supra, and Beha, Carlson & Rosenblum, note 11 supra.
55. Id.
56. See text accompanying note 48 supra. But see C. MURRAY & L. Cox, BEYOND PRO-
BATION (1979). This provocative book presents research findings to support the claim that
custodial treatment under some circumstances may be more effective at reducing recidivism
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climate of hostility towards rehabilitation, 57 however, and support
for more, not less deterrent and incapacitative penalties, 8 advo-
cates of community service as an alternative to incarceration might
do well to resort to other lines of argument.
One such argument in favor of community service proceeds
primarily from a desert orientation. This argument suggests that
within the context of the traditional sentence options of fines, pro-
bation and confinement some offenders are being punished more
than they deserve, and others less.5 9 If offenders are thought to be
overly penalized, the target population for a community service
program might be selected offenders now being imprisoned for lack
of an acceptable alternative (any combination of existing alterna-
tives such as fines or probation presumably being less than this
class of offenders really deserves). In the alternative, community
service might be seen as a way of increasing the severity of punish-
ment for selected offenders for whom the present options of proba-
tion and fines are not thought to be enough punishment. Both
approaches suggest defensible eligibility criteria for selecting
offenders as community service candidates, but, the latter ap-
proach is likely to be considerably more politically appealing to
than treatment in the community.
57. See, e.g., Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform, 35
PUB. INTEREST 22 (1974). Martinson's overall conclusion (that nothing works) is very
adroitly challenged in Gottfredson, Treatment Destruction Techniques, 16 J. RESEARCH IN
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 39 (1979). This reexamination of treatment studies suggests that a
more accurate response to Martinson's question is that some treatments seem to work for
some offenders under some circumstances.
58. See, e.g., J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975): "A 20 percent reduction in
robbery ... is unlikely if we concentrate our efforts on dealing with the causes of crime or
even if we concentrate on improving police efficiency. Were we to devote these resources to a
strategy that is well within our abilities-namely, to incapacitating a larger fraction of the
convicted serious robbers-then not only is a 20 percent reduction possible, but even larger
ones are conceivable." Id. at 199; see also E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975):
"I should argue that criminals have consented to be used to deter others, that they are no
more used against their will than policemen are .... Although they will try to minimize
the risk of punishment, they voluntarily assume it by breaking the law ... Society can use
offenders to deter others, and thereby to protect itself, as it uses policemen." Id. at 182.
Parenthetically, a disputatious offender might respond to Van den Haag that, even if he
assumed the risk of some punishment, he did not consent to being used to deter others;
rather, he might consent only to a penalty limited by consideration of what he deserves for
his wrongful act.
59. This is essentially an exercise in scaling penalties. All other things being equal, it is
interesting to speculate at what point an amount of community service becomes comparable,
in terms of desert, with an amount of incarceration.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
elected officials in a period in which political wisdom dictates ad-
herence to a "law and order" toughness. A balanced consideration
of the four traditional theories of punishment, therefore, leads to
the firm implication that justification of community service must
proceed from, or be significantly bolstered by, other arguments if it
is to be widely accepted as an alternative to incarceration rather
than as a simple means of increasing present levels of social
control.
c. The British Experience Much of the current interest in
community service in the United States stems directly from exper-
imentation with and subsequent widespread use of community ser-
vice orders (CSOs) by courts in England and Wales.6 0 Accordingly,
the way in which service penalties have developed in the British
system may be material to consideration of the sanction as it has
been transplanted to the United States, especially insofar as sup-
port for the concept is predicated upon expectations of reducing
incarceration rates.
Under the practice now prevalent in Britain, unpaid CSOs are
imposed by the court as a sentence in their own right.6 1 As con-
strued by the Home Office, "[t]he primary purpose of the Com-
munity Service Order must be seen as an alternative to custodial
sentences .. ."62 Even after several years of experience with
CSOs this statement of purpose remains: "Whatever the views of
individual officers upon the matter .. . [i]t has been the Home
Office view throughout that the order was intended primarily as an
alternative to short sentences of imprisonment and that has been
the 'official' view of Inner London, Nottingham and Shropshire."68
In addition, when the statute authorizing CSOs was considered by
Parliament: "Ministers stipulated that the community service or-
der was intended primarily for persons who might otherwise be
sentenced to short terms of imprisonment."'"
In fact, under the Criminal Justice Act 1972, in which authori-
zation for the CSO is contained, an offender need have been con-
60. See, e.g., Bergman, Community Service in England: An Alternative to Custodial
Sentence, 39 FED. PROBATION 43 (1975).
61. Griffiths, Community Service By Offenders-I, NEw L.J. 169, 170 (Feb. 12, 1976).
62. Pease, Community Service and the Tariff, CRuM. L. REv. 269, 270 (1978).
63. Griffiths, Community Service By Offenders-II, NEW L.J. 193 (Feb. 19, 1976).
64. Beha, Carlson & Rosenblum, supra note 11, at 16.
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victed of an offense only punishable by imprisonment.6 5 Numerous
offenders who have committed such offenses might not, of course,
have been imprisoned in the absence of the community service op-
tion. Just as the Home Office view is not entirely required by the
statute, it appears to be growing increasingly divorced from actual
practice in Britain. Doubts that CSOs served primarily as an alter-
native to imprisonment were voiced in the earliest Home Office
Research study conducted in the experimental areas where the
program was first introduced in Britain."6 Although the study was
not designed to determine how many of the cases which resulted in
a service order would otherwise have led to incarceration, it did
demonstrate that: "[W]hen a judge did not accept a probation rec-
ommendation for a community service sentence, a custodial sen-
tence was imposed in only a minority of cases. This practice was
found even in those jurisdictions where the Probation Service
clearly viewed community service as an alternative to imprison-
ment, and not as a general sentencing tool. 67
Although the findings of the early Research Unit study are
open to a number of competing interpretations, the possibility that
the experiment with community service might not be proceeding
exactly according to the Home Office's expectations was strength-
ened by a later study, reported in 1977. s In this later study of
cases processed in several of the experimental program regions,
four approaches were taken to address the question: "[I]f commu-
nity service had not been available to the courts which dealt with
these offenders, what other sentences would they have received?"69
First, probation officers were asked for their judgments of what
sentences would otherwise have been passed on those sentenced to
community service. Second, dispositions were examined for offend-
ers who breached the requirement of a CSO and were then resen-
tenced. Third, sentences were studied for cases in which the court
asked the probation department for an assessment of suitability
for community service, but in which service was not ordered. Fi-
65. CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACr 1972 §§ 15-19; see also POWERS OF THE CRIMINAL COURTS ACT
1973 §§ 14-17.
66. Pease, et al., Community Service Orders: Home Office Research Study No. 29,
(HMSO: London 1975).
67. Beha, Carlson & Rosenblum, supra note 11, at 17.
68. Pease, Billingham & Earnshaw, Community Service Assessed in 1976: Home Office
Research Study No. 39, (HMSO: London 1977).
69. Id. (quoting I.J. Croft).
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nally, sentences were examined for those recommended for a CSO
by probation officers, but who did not receive such an order.70 On
the basis of methods one, two, and four, the authors of the Home
Office research report concluded that:
In assessing the proportion of those given community service orders who were
displaced from custody three of the four methods used produced estimates
within the range 45% to 50%. The similarity is seductive. .. . However,
there are a number of arguments which cast doubt on such a conclusion. In
two of these three estimates, there may be factors which would tend to re-
duce the proportion of those diverted from custody. It is not likely that all
those given custodial sentences after a... breach of community service or-
der would originally have received a custodial sentence. Further, it is possible
that probation officers tended to recommend community service orders in
many cases where such a recommendation was a forlorn hope in the face of
an offense for which imprisonment was almost certain. To the extent that
these considerations are true, they tend to reduce the estimated proportion of
those diverted from custody.7'
The fourth method used in the study produced considerably differ-
ent results. Of 102 cases in which the court initiated consideration
of community service, but did not order it, more than 80 percent
did not receive sentences of active imprisonment. 2
The Home Office report was based in most instances on very
small numbers, and each of the methods used to infer the effects of
CSOs on sentencing practice is circumstantial at best. The most
optimistic estimates available, however, suggest that a majority of
CSO cases would not have been incarcerated under traditional sen-
tencing practices. Consequently, descriptions of the British experi-
ence may overstate the benefits of community service sentences, if
they are couched in terms of the Home Office's conception of
CSOs, as being primarily an alternative to incarceration.7 3
Even as a matter of principle, the alternative-to-incarceration
interpretation of community service was not required by members
of the Advisory Council on the Penal System who were its original
proponents:
We have considered whether it should be legally confined to imprisonable
offenses, and while in general we would hope that obligation to perform com-
70. Id. at 3-9.
71. Id. at 9.
72. Id. at 7.
73. See, e.g., Bergman, supra note 60; see also Cromer, Doing Hours Instead of Time.
Community Service as an Alternative to Imprisonment, 11 A.N.Z.J. CRIM. 54 (1978).
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munity service would be felt by the courts to constitute an adequate alterna-
tive to a short custodial sentence, we would not wish to preclude its use in,
for example, certain types of traffic offense which do not involve liability to
imprisonment. Community service should, moreover, be a welcome alterna-
tive in cases in which at present a court imposes a fine for want of a better
sanction.7 4
More recently, another Advisory Council report proposes that the
limitation to imprisonable offenses should be lifted eventually.7 5
d. The Restitution Experience In addition to the influence
of the British CSO, the development of community service in the
United States is frequently inseparable from the related concept of
restitution by criminal offenders. The overlapping development of
community service and restitution in the United States is of
particular interest insofar as restitution is also extensively, and
usually unjustifiably, portrayed as a sanction which serves as an
alternative to incarceration. In a 1977 news release by the Law En-
forcement Assistance Administration about restitution programs,
the headline announced: "Restitution-An Alternative to Jail. 78
Similarly, in a related release it was declared that: "Restitution as
opposed to jail sentencing and heavy fines .. . saves taxpayers
large sums of money and helps ease overcrowding in jails and pris-
ons. . . ." In reality, subsequent evaluation of the programs
about which such claims were made suggests very strongly that
very few offenders, if any at all, avoided being incarcerated because
they were ordered to pay restitution.7 8
The optimistic expectations of an agency that funds restitu-
tion programs, and of administrators of such programs,7 9 are
matched in academic literature by portrayals of restitution, and,
by association, community service, as alternatives to incarceration.
Newton, for example, appears to perpetuate such an impression,
74. Advisory Council on the Penal System, Non-Custodial and Semi-Custodial Penal-
ties 9 (HMSO: London 1970) (emphasis added).
75. Advisory Council on the Penal System, Powers of the Courts Dependent Upon Im-
prisonment (HMSO: London 1977).
76. LEAA Newsletter 1 (No. 7 1977).
77. Corrections Digest 4 (Feb. 16, 1977).
78. See generally Harland, Warren & Brown, Restitution Programs in Six States: Poli-
cies and Procedures (1979) (available on request from Criminal Justice Research Center,
One Alton Road, Albany, N.Y. 12203).
79. See, e.g., Keldgord, supra note 43. "The community restitution program as oper-
ated by the Pima County Adult Probation Department ... is a viable alternative to incar-
ceration ...... Id. at 166.
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first in an article wishfully entitled Alternatives to Imprisonment:
Day Fines, Community Service Orders, and Restitution," and sec-
ond, in a follow-up piece in which the assertion is made that
"[s]entencing to community service or restitution provides an al-
ternative to imprisonment which is positive from every point of
view .... ))81
Although restitution, and almost any other sentencing condi-
tion for that matter, might in theory provide an alternative to im-
prisonment, experience so far demonstrates quite convincingly that
when a victim's claim to restitution conflicts with more traditional
perceptions of the need to incapacitate certain offenders, the possi-
bility of restitution will not often induce a nonincarcerative sen-
tence.82 As appears to be the case for community service, restitu-
tion programs in the United States are almost exclusively designed
either explicitly not to divert offenders from custodial dispositions,
or to deal only with offenders who, by virtue of their offense, usu-
ally of a minor property type, are extremely unlikely candidates for
imprisonment from the onset.8 3
In short, any general characterization of restitution in the
United States as an alternative to incarceration has even less sup-
port in practice than appears to be the case with the community
service order in Britain. Similarly, just as a reading of the Criminal
Justice Act 1972 does not require that CSOs be reserved primarily
for offenders who would otherwise be imprisoned, it would be far
from accurate to suggest that such intent is conveyed in the dozens
of state and federal laws authorizing restitutive dispositions.
8
'
Whether the major source of influence, therefore, is from the
British CSO or from the widespread interest in restitution in the
United States, the foregoing review provides support for the view
that early expectations that community service may act as an al-
ternative to incarceration may be largely unwarranted. An obvious
80. Newton, Alternatives to Imprisonment: Day Fines, Community Service Orders,
and Restitution, 8(1) CRmE & DELINQUENCY LITERATuRE 109 (1970).
81. Id. See generally text at notes 46-49 supra.
82. In interviews conducted recently with nine judges, eight deputy district attorneys
and five probation officers in Multnomah County, Oregon, all the respondents were adamant
in this position. (In-person interviews by author in August, 1978)
83. See generally OFFENDER REsTIION IN THEORY AND ACTION, supra note 23.
84. Harland, Restitution Statutes and Cases: Some Substantive and Procedural Con-
straints, in ViCrims, OFFENDERS, AND ALTERNATIE SANCTIONS (Hudson & Galaway eds.
1980).
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corollary inference is that community service sanctions may act as
a more intrusive penalty when added to traditional sentencing dis-
positions such as probation, or possibly as an alternative to non-
custodial options such as fines or monetary restitution.85 In either
case, such a conclusion presents obvious difficulties for those who
would argue, in support of community service, that the offender
consents to the sanction. This consensual or volutary perception
of community service will now be examined.
2. Voluntary Service Almost as pervasive as the notion that
community service acts as an alternative to incarceration is the im-
age that offenders participating in such programs are "volunteers."
Under the British scheme, for example, the consent of the offender
is statutorily mandated, prior to the imposition of a CSO.8 Simi-
larly, in the United States, many of the community service pro-
grams are housed in "volunteer centers," "volunteer bureaus,"
"volunteer service agencies," or "voluntary action centers," with
program titles such as the Solano Volunteer Work Program.87
Reliance upon the concept of voluntariness or consent in crim-
inal justice has traditionally been subject to critical scrutiny in
every part of the system.88 For community service sentences in
particular, Harris has pointed out that the term volunteer "is a
misnomer for persons under court order to perform assigned
tasks.'"9 Nevertheless, the reasoning of consent is often advanced
in defense of challenged conditions of probation or parole, espe-
cially those imposed under broadly drafted discretionary statutes.90
Such arguments have prevailed over objection in cases involving
restitution, 1 and it seems reasonable to anticipate similar reac-
85. For the discussion of community service as an alternative to monetary penalties, see
text accompanying notes 150-57 infra.
86. See statutes, supra note 65.
87. The Solano program and numerous others with similar titles are listed in Harris,
supra note 5, at 140-48.
88. See, e.g., Cohen, Corrections and Legal Change: Probation and Parole, in PROBA-
TioN, PAROLE AND CoMMuNITY CORRECTIONS 654, 660-61 (2d ed. R. Carter & L. Wilkins
1976). -
89. Harris, supra note 5, at 8.
90. Cohen, supra note 88.
91. See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 24 Or. App. 99, 544 P.2d 616 (1976):
The defendant is being deprived of property without an opportunity to be heard
.... [T]he majority approves joinder of questions of criminal liability with
questions of liability for civil damages.... I find the reasoning... that this
type of sentence presents no constitutional problem because the defendant has
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tions in defense of a court's power to impose community service, or
a particular amount or type of service.
The theory of consent has been extended to the point that
such conditions are treated as contractual, forming "an integral
part of the treaty or covenant which the defendant voluntarily en-
tered into with the court. '92 This line of argument, however, has
been quite soundly discredited," and the better view seems to be
expressed by Rubin: "Although the defendant's consent to proba-
tion should (or must) be obtained, consent alone is not sufficient to
establish probation status where the statute does not authorize it.
The consensual status cannot serve as the basis for sanctions. 9 4
Cohen argues similarly:
Adherence to the strained concept of consent merely impairs our ability to
deal with the real issue. All of us recognize that probation and parole involve
a legal situation where the government, presumably by prior lawful proce-
dures, has the legitimate authority to exercise some control over the liberty of
an individual. While the offender should be afforded a more active role and
greater procedural and substantive protections, ultimately it is those in au-
thority and not the offender who select between a community or institutional
disposition; the offer of freedom, however conditional, normally will be more
attractive than the alternative. Thus our major concern should be for deter-
the "choice" of refusing probation subject to unacceptable conditions and going
to prison-to be singularly unpersuasive.
Id. at 105-06, 544 P.2d at 619-20 (Schwab, C.J., dissenting). See also State v. Barnett, 110
Vt. 221, 3 A.2d 521 (1939):
Therefore, to force a [restitutive] settlement by the threat of imprisonment, if
such condition is not met, may be to deprive the respondent of the right to pre-
sent his defense and have its sufficiency passed upon in a civil court .... The
consent of the respondent is not conclusive of the fact of his liability, for who
would not consent under such circumstances?
Id. at 235-36, 3 A.2d at 527 (Sherburne, J., dissenting).
92. State v. Smith, 233 N.C. 68, 70, 62 S.E.2d 495, 496 (1950).
93. Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. R.v. 181, 192 (1967).
The view that probation is a "privilege" extended to the probationer has not met with favor
in recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972), the Court ruled that a parolee must be granted a hearing before parole is re-
voked, noting that: "It is hardly useful any longer to try to deal with this problem in terms
of whether the parolee's liberty is a 'right' or a 'privilege.' By whatever name, the liberty is
valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
482. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (constitutional challenge to proce-
dures preceding state's withdrawal of welfare benefits cannot be answered by argument that
public assistance benefits are a privilege and not a right).
94. S. RUBiN, THE LAw OF CmMINAL CORRECTION 185 (1963).
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mining the appropriate limits on the exercise of authority, and not for a
chimerical right of rejection."
Under the British program, it seems questionable whether of-
fenders would truly consent to perform unpaid services if they
were informed on a case by case basis of what seems apparent in
aggregate; the typical CSO is not an alternative to incarceration,
but an additional burden, or at best an alternative to some other
noncustodial penalty such as a fine. It seems probable that only
implicit, and, mostly unwarranted assumptions"' of impending in-
carceration induce such "consent" in a majority of cases. "The sit-
uation now is that in no case can it be shown what other sentence a
community service order is replacing, either to the offender or to a
court which may be called upon to revoke the order .... ,,e1
If a court's right to require a particular community service
sentence was challenged in an American court, any counter argu-
ment based upon the offender's consent to the penalty would likely
be viewed as a strained fiction. This would be true whether consent
is explicitly required in community service statutes such as those
in Maryland, New York and Ohio,98 or merely argued to support
community service orders in jurisdictions in which no explicit stat-
utory authority exists. It would be a mockery of due process for the
court to permit a defendant to consent to community service out of
fear of a penalty that there is no danger of the court imposing.
Consent under such circumstances should hardly be considered an
effective waiver of legal rights; yet such an occurrence is not diffi-
cult to imagine where the feared alternative constitutes a severe
deprivation in the mind of the defendant, such as loss of his driv-
ing license, or more generally, loss of liberty.
If the implicit threat of the above type of deprivation were
removed, however, by informing offenders, for example, that fail-
ure to consent would not lead to incarceration, continued reliance
upon consensual community service raises two further problems.
Most obviously, as the British Advisory Council on the Penal Sys-
tem notes: "The question inevitably arises whether that consent is
likely to be forthcoming in the absence of imprisonment as an al-
95. Cohen, supra note 88, at 669.
96. See generally text accompanying notes 58-73 supra.
97. Pease, supra note 62, at 273.
98. See Table 1.
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ternative sentence."99 Second, where the alternative takes the form
of a financial sanction such as a fine or costs,100 the specter is
raised of indigent offenders "volunteering" because of inability to
pay, while wealthier offenders are permitted to buy their way out
of the community service penalty.1 0
3. Community Service as Rehabilitation Approval of com-
munity service on the grounds that it is voluntarily entered into by
the offender is frequently buttressed by claims about the potential
rehabilitative value of service penalties. Speaking of the British ex-
perience with the CSO, for example, Bergman suggests that: "This
device, probably more than any other, provides a way by which the
offender and the community may become reciprocally involved and
reconciled. This is, after all, one of the ideals of the rehabilitation
process. ' 10 2 Similarly, it is often said by program administrators
that participation in a service program "offers the probationer the
opportunity to develop a sense of responsibility, to learn work hab-
its, to improve work habits, and to learn job skills."103
In addition to its role in marshalling such general support for
the concept, the rehabilitative appeal of community service is also
relied upon specifically in justification of judicial authority to re-
quire its performance without explicit statutory authority. 1" Based
on a formal opinion from the General Counsel of the Administra-
99. Advisory Council on the Penal System, supra note 74, at 24.
100. For discussion of a Canadian program that claims to operate specifically to avoid
incarcerating offenders who are unable to afford to pay fines, see Saskatchewan's Fine Op-
tion Experiment, 1(11) LiAisoN 5 (1976). Emphasizing the need for Canada to seek alterna-
tives to incarceration on both humanitarian and economic grounds, Canada's Solicitor Gen-
eral, Bob Kaplan, recently pledged that the federal government in that country "would work
to clear away some of the legal obstacles that stand in the way of the expanded use of...
community service orders, probation, restitution and compensation." 6(7) Lli)soN 4 (1980).
101. See text accompanying notes 150-57 infra.
102. Bergman, supra note 60, at 46.
103. Keldgord, supra note 43, at 162; cf. Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 266 N.W.2d
403 (1978) (restitution can aid rehabilitation by strengthening sense of responsibility).
104. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8:
Since I became a Federal [sic] district judge in 1961, I have often wondered why
- . . [probationers] could and should not be required to do some work, without
pay, for public or charitable agencies .... As I envisaged the advantages, they
would be the following- (1) so far as the probationer himself is concerned, his
being required to do work without pay for a good cause should have some thera-
peutic effect since this would make him atone for his misdeed in a concrete and
constructive way.
Id. at 7; but see People v. Mandell, 50 A.D.2d 907, 377 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1975). See text accom-
panying note 109 infra.
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tive Office of the United States Courts, for example, the Chief
Judge of the United States District Court in Memphis,'Tennessee,
has concluded that under the discretionary powers granted by the
Federal Probation Act:
The imposition of a special condition of work without pay would not violate
the constitutional or statutory rights of the probationer provided that the
condition was reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the probationer and
to the protection of the public and that the probationer had reasonable notice
of what was expected of him. More specifically, if such conditions were met,
there would be no denial of substantive or procedural due process, no invol-
untary servitude, and no violation of the minimum wage laws.105
In contrast is a 1972 New York Attorney General's opinion
about the use of a community service disposition under section
65.10 of the state's Penal Law.1 After listing a variety of permissi-
ble probation conditions, not including community service, the
statute contained a general provision under which the defendant
might be required to "[s]atisfy any other conditions reasonably re-
lated to his rehabilitation."'1 7 Arguing that this provision did not
authorize a court to require as a condition of probation or condi-
tional discharge that the defendant work on city projects without
pay, the Attorney General's opinion declared: "Such a condition, if
it could legally be imposed, should be specifically authorized by
law and not rest on the authority of a court to impose a condition
'reasonably related to rehabilitation.' ""
A similar view was taken more recently in the New York case,
People v. Mandell,109 in which the defendant entered guilty pleas
to charges of bribery and bribe receiving. On the latter charge
Mandell received five years probation, with a condition that he
provide volunteer services to a charitable foundation. A three-
judge panel, found, without further explication, that:
105. Brown, supra note 8, at 7. Interestingly, the General Counsel who supplied the
memorandum cited by Judge Brown has elsewhere categorized as "questionable conditions
of probation" requirements to contribute to or work for a charitable cause. Imlay &
Glasheen, See What Condition Your Conditions Are In, in PROBATION, PAROLE AND COMMU-
NITY CORRECTIONS, supra note 88, at 432, 434.
106. N.Y.S. Op. Arr'y GEN. 234 (1972).
107. N.Y. Penal Law § 65.10(2)(i) (McKinney 1979). The New York Law has subse-
quently been amended to permit community service as a condition of probation under very
limited circumstances. See Table 1, supra.
108. N.Y.S. Op. ATr'Y GEs., supra note 106, at 236.
109. People v. Mandell, 50 A.D.2d 907, 377 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1975).
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It appears that, prior to sentence, defendant volunteered for service with the
Tay-Sachs and Allied Diseases Foundation and on this appeal he does not
question the propriety of that condition of his probation. There is no author-
ity in law for mandating such service as a condition of probation (Penal
Law, § 65.10). Therefore on this court's own motion, the condition of such
volunteer service must be stricken. However, defendant's continuance of such
service on his own initiative will undoubtedly inure to his benefit vis-a-vis his
conduct evaluation by the Probation Department.110
Assumption of broad discretionary power to order community
service in the interest of rehabilitation is problematical in several
respects, especially in the absence of explicit statutory authority.
Norval Morris, for example, has argued that: "[P]ower over a crim-
inal's life should not be taken in excess of that which would be
taken were his reform not considered as one of our purposes." '111
Elsewhere, he argued: "Few now doubt that large abuses of power
under the criminal law may well flow from adjusting power over
the criminal's life to the presumed necessities of his compelled
cure, time without end, bureaucratic benevolence without sensitiv-
ity or self doubt. '112
Case law in the related area of restitution demonstrates re-
peatedly that reliance upon rehabilitative expectations by sentenc-
ing judges can give rise to the types of abuses alluded to by Morris.
In particular it can lead to greatly reduced due process protections
for an offender. Perhaps no better example exists than the heavily
criticized California case, People v. Miller.l12 In Miller the defen-
dant was a building contractor who was convicted on one count of
grand theft. He was ordered to pay restitution to two victims, the
Keefes, from whom he had accepted $821 as an advance for home
remodeling work which he failed to perform. Eight months after
the original probation order, on the basis of summary review of a
memorandum by a probation officer, the court raised the restitu-
tion for the Keefes to $2,000 and added a further $6,600 to other
customers of the defendant's "borderline operation[s]. 11 4
Although the district attorney in Miller testified that there
was considerable evidence in the criminal trial that the defendant
110. Id. at 908.
111. N. MORRIS & C. HOWARD, STUDIES IN CRIMINAL LAW 175 (1964).
112. N. MORRIS, THE FUTUa OF IMPRIsoNsMr 18 (1974).
113. 256 Cal. App. 2d 348, 64 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1967).
114. Id. at 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
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had cheated persons other than the original two victims,115 the ap-
pellate court concluded that "there is no indication that any of the
claims other than those of the Keefes were based on criminal con-
duct, nor is there any showing that they were based on fraudulent
representations to the claimants of the sort made to the Keefes,
resulting in defendant's conviction." 116 Nevertheless, the amended
restitution order was upheld on the grounds that: "Probation is
granted in hope of rehabilitating the defendant and must be condi-
tioned on the realities of the situation, without all of the technical
limitations determining the scope of the offense of which defen-
dant was convicted. 11 7 In so ruling, it has been said that the court
"merely pays lip service to the [statutory] requirement that the
injury serving as a basis for the restitution must 'result from' the
criminal act, by casually noting that the rehabilitative value of the
condition of probation involved 'belies the remoteness' of the in-
jury from the criminal conduct of which Miller was convicted."118
Even where reliance upon the rehabilitative rationale is less
casual than may have been the case in Miller, resort to a "benevo-
lent purpose" argument to justify the imposition of community
service raises several other difficulties. It seems reasonable, for ex-
ample, to ask how long judges may continue to justify their imposi-
tion of community service on this basis, before requiring some em-
pirical evidence that suggests that their expectations about its
rehabilitative value have any merit. After several years of employ-
ing community service as a sentencing option, all claims about its
rehabilitative efficacy continue to be perpetuated by impressionis-
tic and anecdotal accounts by judges 9 and probation officers,12
more than by the results of rigorous scientific evaluation.121 As one
participant at a recent trial judges conference on community ser-
vice noted:
I'd like to say that in combatting the wave for totally removing judicial dis-
115. Id. at 352, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
116. Id. at 355, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
117. Id. at 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
118. Note, Use of Restitution in the Criminal Process: People f. Miller, 16 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 456, 462 (1969).
119. See, e.g., Challeen & Heinlen, The Win-Onus Restitution Program, in OFFENDER
RESTITUTION IN THEORY AND ACTION, supra note 23, at 151.
120. See, e.g., Coker, Community Service in Hampshire (England), INT'L J. OF OF-
FENDER THERAPY AND CoMPs. CRIMINOLOGY 114 (1976).
121. See, e.g., Pease, Billingham & Earnshaw, supra note 66.
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cretion and establishing flat sentences and mandatory sentences, you cannot
combat it with anecdotal stories on how one particular innovative sentence
seemed to work. Any number of interesting anecdotal stories cannot combat
that wave and cannot be persuasive on legislatures. You need hard data on
recidivism; you need hard data on changes in victim attitudes; changes in
police attitudes; changes in offender attitudes; changes in court attitudes;
changes in prosecution attitudes; and hard-nosed program evaluations for
those few programs that seek to implement community service sentencing on
a regular basis. That's the only way that the judges' case can be brought to
the legislature. And I think that's what's sorely lacking in every jurisdiction
that I know of, including my own."'
Additionally, there is conflicting evidence as to whether com-
munity service is used primarily, or even at all, for its possible re-
habilitative effects, as much as it is for its punitive impact. 12 Re-
porting on a program in Canada, Newton states that: "The
community work sentence was perceived above all as a means of
rehabilitation by the judges, attorneys, and probation officers who
participated in the experiment. 1 24 By comparison, in interviews
conducted with prosecutors and judges and a recent study of a res-
titution and community service program in Portland, Oregon, all of
the respondents made it very clear that they saw community ser-
vice mainly as an opportunity to "give teeth" to a probation order.
Otherwise, the consensus was that expressed by judges elsewhere,
viewing probation alone as "little more than a release of the defen-
dant without sanction. '125
Regardless of the actual intentions of the court, however, the
primary difficulty with defending the imposition of community ser-
vice on the basis of rehabilitation, especially in the complete ab-
sence of explicit legislative mandate, is expressed by Jacobson:
[T]he inherent vagueness of the concept of rehabilitation would provide little
substantive constraint on the court's discretion. As a rule of law, rehabilita-
tion may mean all things to all courts.... [A]lowing the trial courts to im-
pose any condition they subjectively believe to be of rehabilitative value, of-
122. Statement by Judge Paul A. Chernoff, District Court of Newton, Massachusetts, at
Trial Judges' Conference, sponsored .by Creative Alternatives to Prison, SuBcoMM. ON AD-
MINISTRATIVE PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Comm. Print 1978).
123. But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.091 (West 1979), Table 1, supra, which can be taken
to imply by its language that community service is not a punishment (in addition to any
punishment, the court may order the defendant to perform a specified public service).
124. Newton, supra note 8, at 445.
125. - Interviews, supra note 82; SENTENCING AND PROBATION 259 (1976 ed. G. Revelle,
Nat'l. College of State Judiciary).
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fers, in fact, no legal guidelines and would increase the likelihood of abuses of
discretion. The fact that appellate tribunals most often defer to the discre-
tion of trial judges in probation matters heightens the need for substantive
guidelines.
12 6
D. Summary
From the foregoing discussion, the New York position in
People v. Mandell,12 requiring explicit statutory authorization of
community service dispositions, appears to have much to commend
it. Community service, in general, is neither an alternative to in-
carceration, nor a truly voluntary endeavor on the part of most of-
fenders. In addition, there is doubt about the role, if any, which
the possible rehabilitative effects of community service may play in
sentencing decisions, and about the merit which rehabilitative
claims for service penalties may have. Rather, stripped of its eu-
phemistic terminology, the "voluntary service alternative" bears a
striking resemblance to the Thirteenth Amendment concept of in-
voluntary penal servitude as a punishment for crime. As such, the
distinction in Commonwealth v. Walton2 between the court's dis-
cretionary control over probation conditions and the legislature's
primacy in matters of punishment 2' becomes extremely question-
able if applied to community service. Whatever vehicle is used to
impose the sanction, "the design of penalties for crime is a legisla-
tive and not a judicial function and authority to impose punish-
ment must be found in statutory law."130
A requirement of explicit legislative approval of community
service orders has two major advantages. First, it may force consid-
eration of the desirability of widespread use of community service,
as a matter of public policy. Especially, in view of the discrimina-
tory potential if used as an alternative to financial sanctions,131 se-
rious thought must be given to the propriety of replacing one class
of people bound to involuntary servitude on the basis of race by
another class similarly bound on the basis of a criminal conviction
and economic status.
126. Note, supra note 118, at 462.
127. 50 A.D.2d 907, 377 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1975).
128. 43 Pa. 588, 397 A.2d 1179 (1979).
129. 43 Pa. at 598, 397 A.2d at 1184; see text accompanying note 40 supra.
130. State v. Wright, 156 N.J. Super. 559, 562, 384 A.2d 199, 201 (1978).
131. See, e.g., Beha, Carson & Rosenblum, supra note 11, at 38-40; see also text ac-
companying notes 154-60 infra.
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If community service is found to satisfy the test of public pol-
icy consideration, the second advantage of statutory authorization
may be to provide impetus towards defining the appropriate limits
on its exercise. It has been argued that broad discretion over the
amount and type of community service is necessary in order to
properly individualize sentences." Concern for equitable distribu-
tion of sanctions, reduction of unjustified disparity, and control of
excessive or inappropriate penalties, however, all point toward the
need for development of a body of rules addressed towards defin-
ing the substantive and procedural constraints under which com-
munity service programs might be implemented and administered.
Recent enactments, however, are disappointing. Most of the
statutes included in Table 1 are more notable for what they do not
contain than for the guidance they offer criminal justice practition-
ers charged with the imposition and enforcement of community
service penalties. The following Practice Commentary accompany-
ing the New York Community Service Probation Law typifies the
minimal direction under which many judges and .programs are
operating:
As drafted, the instant provision contains sparse details and furnishes little
guidance to its implementation. It would have been helpful for it to contain
an indication of the kinds of public and not-for-profit agencies and organiza-
tions intended to be included and specified who is to have the authority and
responsibility for selecting those to be approved for participation and for the
monitoring of the program. With respect to the probationers and conditional
discharges who are to participate, there is no indication whether they are to
be compensated for their work or whether their services are expected to be
rendered without pay as part of their punishment. As it stands, therefore,
this provision furnishes only the barest statutory authority. It is to be hoped
that the unanswered elements can be filled in by cooperative administrative
action.11
As is no doubt true in other cases, the New York statute was
enacted with a particular program in mind. It was sought by the
City of New York, to overcome the holding in People v. Mandell,
to permit a specific rehabilitation program for convicted misde-
meanants.2" Obviously, however, the statute also affects the use of
community service by judges throughout the state, many of whom
no doubt wonder about the wisdom of restricting it to misdemean-
132. Pease, supra note 62, at 274.
133. Practice Commentary, N.Y. PINAL LAW § 65.10(2)(f-1) (McKinney 1979).
134. Id.
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ants. Many others may be operating under widely different as-
sumptions with respect to such critical decisions as who should be
required to perform community service, for whom, for how long,
and with what anticipated results. Confusion and gross disparities
in the operational interpretation of community service authority
must obviously be minimized if the penalty is to be administered
with any semblance of consistency, or even rational variation, that
will withstand legal and political scrutiny in the future. Several
specific aspects of implementation and administration of commu-
nity service merit particular attention.
II-. IMPLEMENTATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF COMMUNITY
SERVICE: SPECIFIC IssuEs
A. Eligibility Criteria
The decision as to who may be an appropriate candidate for
community service raises both programmatic and legal questions.
From both perspectives, concern is focused upon attaining the fun-
damental purpose of the program as fully as possible, while at the
same time guaranteeing consistent application of selection stan-
dards that are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory under the due
process and equal protection mandates of the constitution.3 5
In order to select offenders whose participation in community
service is most likely to permit attainment of the primary aims in-
volved in using the sanction, and to provide a basis against which
to assess the program's progress toward those aims, a clearly con-
ceptualized statement of primary goals and objectives at the outset
of any program becomes imperative. Indeed, at a time when ac-
countability of correctional programs, and rehabilitative programs
in particular,3 6 has become a familiar precept, the long-term fu-
ture of community service penalties may well depend on the speed
and extent to which legislators and practitioners are able to articu-
late, achieve and document attainment of the sanction's purposes.
The almost total absence of purposive direction in the area of
135. Eligibility decisions also must of course be made with an eye toward the politica"
and legal liability that might ensue if a high-risk offender is admitted and injures someone.
For a discussion of some of the tort liability issues in this regard, see text accompqnyipg
notes 185-208 infra.
136. See, e.g., Martinson, supra note 57. Accountability is used here to imply effective-
ness in meeting rehabilitative and/or diversionary goals, and visibility of both the processes
and rationales upon which decisions are made.
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community service, however, emphasizes the continuing accuracy
of H.L.A. Hart's observation that:
No one expects judges or statesmen occupied in the business of [punish-
ment], or in making (or unmaking) laws which enable this to be done, to have
time for philosophical discussion of the principles which make it morally tol-
erable .... A judicial bench is not and should not be a professorial chair.13'
Although this reality might be a passable indulgence in the context
of the ageless dilemma of why we punish at all, it becomes in many
respects a callous injustice if applied to the narrower and more
manageable question of why we punish in a particular way.
Especially because of the prospect that community service
may become a major shift in our entire style of punishment, as it
has in Britain,' it seems sensible to attempt to benefit from the
historical lessons of other major punitive innovations. Imprison-
ment is a timely example. The introduction of the penitentiary was
considered by reformers of the period and for long afterwards in
much the same light as community service is today, "as a marvel-
ous opportunity to promote the welfare of the society along with
the welfare of the offender. . . . For its proponents, the system
was elegant in that it benefited both the society and the of-
fender." 139 Already there are warning signs that to introduce com-
munity service with comparably euphoric fanfare may result in dis-
appointment and disaffection, similar to that now directed toward
imprisonment, when the wisdom of hindsight is brought to bear. In
the context of justifying the use of community service, analogy
with the following view of incarceration is striking: "[If we] subject
all premises to a simple but often devastating question-How do
you know that? or, Why do you want that?-it turns out that, with
regard to punishment in general and incarceration in particular,
myth masquerades as fact and value choices frequently remain
unexamined.' 140
For society to justify such a potentially far-reaching swing to-
137. H.L.A. HART, PuNisHmENrr AND REsPONsIBILrrY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
2 (1968).
138. George Pratt, Deputy Chief of the Inner London Probation Service, reported at
the 1980 ABA conference on community service in Detroit, Mich., that community service
will surpass probation this year as the most frequently used disposition by British courts.
139. Gaylin & Rothman, Introduction to A. VON HIImscH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE
OF PUNISHMENTS at xxx-xxxi (1976).
140. Id. at xxxiii.
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ward community service penalties, myths must be quickly dis-
pelled and dominant value choices must be surfaced; otherwise,
state control over individual liberty threatens to be extended on
the basis of a politically convenient eclecticism, replete with a
mindlessly fuzzy assortment of unarticulated or under-articulated
rationales. If community service is intended as an alternative to
imprisonment, whether as an adjustment of existing scales of de-
sert or simply as an effort to cut costs, the purpose should be
stated in the enabling statute, and eligibility criteria should be
drafted to reflect the purpose. Similarly, if community service is
authorized among the rehabilitative conditions of probation, as is
the case in New York, then the theory underlying the rehabilita-
tive assumptions should be made explicit; that theory should also
be reflected eventually in diagnostic eligibility criteria and both
the theory and crite;ia should be subjected to empirical verifica-
tion and reconsideration within a given period of time.142 If it is
argued, for example, that the community service "offers the proba-
tioner the opportunity to develop a sense of responsibility, to learn
work habits, to improve work habits, and to learn job skills, ' 143 it
remains to be sked why paid employment might not be equally or
more effective.
If clarifying the purpose of community service, and thereby
the criteria for its use, is considered a microcosm of the more
global task of justifying punishment in general, an analytical
framework may be very loosely adapted from Hart:
[W]hat is most needed is not the simple admission that instead of a single
value or aim (Deterrence, Retribution, Reform or any other) a plurality of
different values and aims should be given as a conjunctive answer to some
question concerning the justification of punishment. What is needed is the
realization that different principles (each of which may in a sense be called a
'justification') are relevant at different points in any morally acceptable ac-
count of punishment. What we should look for are answers to a number of
different questions such as: What justifies the general practice of punish-
141. But see text accompanying notes 224-26 infra for the difficulties involved.
142. In a recent report on the first seven years of community service in Inner London,
for example, it is noted that: "It was soon demonstrated that some offenders were unsuita-
ble for community service. These included, inter alia, alcoholics, drug addicts and the long-
term unemployed who were not only unreliable in attendance and performance but unable
to sustain their efforts. even over a relatively short period." Inner London Probation and
After Care Service, Community Service by Offenders 1 (1980) (unpublished mimeo provided
by George Pratt, Deputy Chief Probation Officer).
143. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
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ment? To whom may punishment be applied? How severely may we punish?
In dealing with these and other questions concerning punishment we should
bear in mind that in this, as in most other social institutions, the pursuit of
one aim may be qualified by or provide an opportunity, not to be missed, for
the pursuit of others .
44
As applied to community service, Hart's prescriptions are
much more than philosophical niceties. They have immediate legal
and political relevance to the implementation and administration
of community service as a sanction. Precedent is ample in other
areas of criminal justice decisionmaking showing that a failure to
define and demonstrate adherence to a defensible rationale for ac-
tion is an open invitation for political and legal reproach, and ulti-
mate imposition of externally devised controls on the exercise of
discretion.
The legal attack on corrections,145 the abolition of parole in
some jurisdictions1 46 and adoption of guidelines as a survival mea-
sure in other areas of criminal justice147 all attest to the incentive
for proponents of community service to work toward the develop-
ment of explicit decisionmaking policies as a means of averting
eventual external interference or control. The logic behind taking
such preemptive measures seems to be dawning belatedly on the
field of sentencing in general; faced with the prospect of legisla-
tively imposed flat sentencing, 4 8 several jurisdictions have adopted
or are experimenting with sentencing guidelines of various kinds.14
9
Judges in Philadelphia, for instance, are experimenting with the
idea of empirically derived guidelines as a means of improving bail
setting decisions. 50 A vital preliminary to such activities in the
area of community service is the clear conceptualization of the pur-
poses for which the sanction is being used and corresponding crite-
ria for selecting offenders to participate.
144. Hart, supra note 137, at 3.
145. See generally, D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF: THE JUSTICE MODEL Fon
CORRECTIONS (1975).
146. A. VON HIRsCH & K.J. HANRAHAN, ABOLISH PAROLE? U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE (1978).
147. See generally Gottfredson, et al., Classification for Parole Decision Policy, U.S.
DEP'T JUSTICE (1978).
148. See Determinate Sentencing: Reform or Regression, (Proceedings of Special Con-
ference on Determinate Sentencing, June 2-3, 1977). U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE (Mar. 1978).
149. See generally, M.R. GoTrFREDsON & D. Go'rrFREDSON, supra note 1, at 192-99,
294-306, 350-51.
150. Goldkamp, Gottfredson & Gedney, Bail After Bail Reform: The Feasibility of a
Guidelines Approach, 3 PaREmuAL. SERVICES ANN. J. 3 (1980).
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Adopting explicit policies and criteria for imposing community
service may in the short-term increase a program's susceptibility to
challenge. Offenders may feel that the standards themselves are
unwarranted or that they have been applied discriminatorily in
their particular cases. Careful justification for each criterion, how-
ever, will minimize the chances of difficulty under the former ap-
proach, and a requirement of explicit reasons for going outside the
stated criteria will reduce the probability of a successful challenge
of the latter type.151 Through periodic review of such reasons,
moreover, a self-regulating mechanism is created to allow routine
modification of those criteria that prove to be most frequently
negated.
Review of recent community service sentencing laws provides
scant indication of an overriding purpose behind the statutes,5 3
and comparably little specific guidance as to who might be an ap-
propriate service candidate. Examination of the second column of
Table I shows that community service is usually authorized as a
general condition of sentence, probation or conditional discharge.
Where particular offenses or offenders are specified, the reason for
their selection is not immediately apparent, beyond a common fo-
cus upon avoiding all but the least serious cases.153
One aspect of selecting offenders to perform community ser-
vice that may lead to immediate legal difficulties is the practice of
selecting offenders on the basis of their inability to pay monetary
penalties. In Delaware, for example, courts are permitted by stat-
ute to require community service by offenders sentenced to pay
fines, costs or both, where the offender is unable to pay at the time
of sentence or in accordance with terms of payment set by the
court. This, of course, raises a situation in which offenders who can
afford to pay may buy themselves out of a work assignment, while
those without financial resources must submit to the service pen-
alty or be incarcerated. Whether such a result violates the Equal
151. See Gottfredson, et al., supra note 147; see also Gottfredson, Parole Guidelines
and the Reduction of Sentencing Disparity, 16 J. OF RESEARCH IN CaIum AND DELINQUENCY
218 (1979).
152. Many of the statutes, however, include community service among what have tradi-
tionally been held to be the rehabilitative conditions of probation. See in particular, the
New York statute in column seven of Table 1, supra.
153. Shoplifting (Arizona); petty theft (California, Florida); property destruction and
unauthorized entry (New Hampshire); misdemeanors and violations (New York); no violent
offenders (Maryland). See Table 1, supra.
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rests upon one's
reading of the Supreme Court's decisions in Tate v. Short1"' and
Williams v. Illinois.1 55
In Tate the Supreme Court adopted the view announced in an
earlier case that: "[T]he Constitution prohibits the State from im-
posing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it
into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot
forthwith pay the fine in full."1581 The premise of this conclusion
was stated in Williams to be that "the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the statutory ceiling
placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be the same
for all defendants irrespective of their economic status.1 1 57 Conse-
quently, it might be argued that automatic conversion of fines into
community service for indigent offenders unconstitutionally raises
the ceiling of punishment for those offenders when the penalty for
others who are able to pay is limited to a fine. Several points raised
by Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Tate, however,
might be construed to attentuate the equal protection argument.
In striking down the automatic conversion of fines to imprison-
ment for indigent offenders, Justice Brennan observed that "other
alternatives" exist to which litigators and judges may constitution-
ally resort to serve the State's valid interest in enforcing payment
of fines.15
Similarly, in Williams, the Court had noted that:
The State is not powerless to enforce judgments against those financially un-
able to pay a fine; indeed, a different result would amount to inverse discrim-
ination since it would enable an indigent to avoid both the fine and imprison-
ment for nonpayment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or
the other conviction. 59
In addition, even if the practice of converting fines or restitution to
service at the time of sentencing proves to be an unconstitutional
alternative on the authority of Tate, it may be more difficult to
press similar arguments if the conversion is made only after a suit-
154. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
155. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
156. 401 U.S. at 398 (citing Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970)).
157. 399 U.S. at 244 (footnote omitted).
158. 401 U.S. at 399; but see Beha, Carlson & Rosenblum, supra note 11: "[T]he
quoted language clearly refers to modes of collecting the monies due, and not to alternative
sanctions." Id. at 40 (emphasis in original).
159. 399 U.S. at 244 (footnote omitted).
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able period of time has lapsed during which an offender is given
the option of paying the fine. For, as Justice Brennan stated in
Tate:
We emphasize that our holding today does not suggest any constitutional in-
firmity in imprisonment of a defendant with the means to pay a fine who
refuses or neglects to do so. Nor is our decision to be understood as preclud-
ing imprisonment as an enforcement method when alternative means are un-
successful despite the defendant's reasonable efforts to satisfy the fines by
those means; the determination of the constitutionality of imprisonment in
that circumstance must await the presentation of a concrete case.160
B. Service Parameters
1. Need for Standards When determining the types and
amounts of community service that criminal offenders may be re-
quired to perform, two general issues merit attention. First, what
standards should service penalties be required to meet? And, sec-
ond, who should devise and apply those standards? For although
the scope and locus of regulatory authority over service placements
may be a matter for debate, an undeniable need to assure their
quality, fairness, and accountability is created at a minimum by:
a) concern for whatever beneficial purposes the service is expected
to accomplish and b) considerations of potential legal liability for
injury to and by the offender during the course of the service
assignment.
Especially where community service dispositions are devel-
oped on an ad hoc, nonstatutory basis, at the discretion of individ-
ual sentencing judges and probation officers, the possibility is great
that there will be lax and widely varying standards governing all or
part of the imposition, enforcement, and evaluation or service pen-
alties. Even in those jurisdictions with explicit statutory provision
for community service sentencing, only a few offer much specific
guidance as to the policies and procedures under which service dis-
positions are to be carried out.
2. Service Amount Most of the statutes in Table 1 do not set
either upper or lower limits on the amount of community service
that can be required; nor do they emphasize factors that should be
taken into account by sentencing judges in the exercise of their
160. 401 U.S. at 400-01; but see In Re Antazio, 473 P.2d 999 (1970) (denial of equal
protection to imprison for failure to pay if offender is unable but willing to pay assessed
fines).
19801 467
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
discretion. In the few exceptions in which standards are set, how-
ever, there is surprising variation in the approaches taken. The
only jurisdictions in which the number of hours is given a specific
statutory ceiling, as in the British scheme, are New Hampshire and
Ohio, where no more than fifty and eighty hours, respectively, are
permitted. No standards are given in either statute to govern the
imposition of less than the maximum number of hours. In four of
the States listed in Table 1 the amount of community service is
statutorily required to be based upon the work-equivalent of a
monetary disposition. In California and Florida the amount of
community service is to be no less than would be required to sat-
isfy a $50 to $1000 fine if converted at the minimum wage at the
time of sentencing.161 No criteria or limits are set for going beyond
the maximum related to a fine. In Delaware a similar formula is
used to calculate the number of hours required to satisfy fines and
costs; 16 2 in cases involving Justices of the Peace in Delaware the
number of hours of work which may be assigned is to be based
upon guidelines established by the Deputy Administrator of those
courts. 63 Only in two of the statutes in Table 1 is any attention
paid to the issue of the schedule within which the service amount
is to be completed. Under the Ohio and Oklahoma statutes the of-
fender's term of service is to be set by the court according to a
schedule consistent with his employment and family
responsibilities.'"
Because the statutes in Table 1 provide little limitation upon
the discretion of sentencing judges, and because, even less restraint
is present where the judge simply assumes power to impose service
penalties two very real dangers must be addressed. The first of
these involves the problems of defining the outer limits of service
161. Basing community service on a fine may give an unwarranted appearance of ra-
tionality if fines themselves are imposed without standards or guidelines to avoid disparity.
See, e.g., State v. Ross, 55 Or. 450, 106 P. 1022, appeal dismissed, 227 U.S. 150 (1910)
(offender ordered to pay fine over 2 million dollars, or be imprisoned at $1.00 per day,
which is approximately 800 years); see also Thornstedt, Day-Fine System in Sweden, Caiu.
L. REv. 307 (1975).
162. See also KAN. STAT. § 21-4610(3)(n) (Supp. 1979) (court may include among condi-
tions of probation or suspension of sentence that defendant shall perform services under a
system of day-fines).
163. It is unclear whether the guidelines referred to in the Maryland law noted in Table
1 relate to the amount of service or more general administration.
164. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2951.02(G) (1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 991a (West
1979).
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amounts and scaling within those boundaries. Failure to set at
least presumptive limitations during the early stages of developing
community service penalties has already led to difficulties; com-
menting upon a disposition involving 2,920 hours of service, Harris
raises a most critical question:
A sentence involving 2920 hours of service could be worked off by putting in
eight hours a day every day for a year, or four hours every Saturday for al-
most 14 years. This would be more than ten times the [240] hours that a
felony offender in Britain could be asked to perform.
In the absence of upper limits on hours of work that can be required, minor
offenders are being sentenced to perform service hours that could require
years to complete. If these sentences are viewed as a penalty that is commen-
surate with relatively minor crimes, will it be possible for community service
to receive the consideration it deserves as a means of punishing more serious
offenses? 165
The fact that community service amounts in the United States
may far exceed the permissible limits in Britain is consistent with
the much greater reliance upon incarceration and upon more se-
vere penalties in general in the United States. As a matter of polit-
ical reality, therefore, if community service can ever become a ma-
jor alternative to incarceration in the United States, it seems
reasonable to expect that the number of hours required is likely to
be very large: "Just as Americans dish out imprisonment in buck-
etfuls rather than spoonfuls, there is a danger of drowning the
community service sentence as a reasonable option." '
In addition, there are signs that it may take a considerable
educational effort before even extended service will be -accepted by
the general public and practitioners as a penalty comparable in se-
verity to any period of incarceration.16 7 By being associated with
other more traditionally assistance oriented conditions, of proba-
tion, it is possible that community service may suffer an unwar-
ranted image problem of being another "slap on tlhe wrist" pro-
position. 8" By divorcing the two concepts as much as possible, and
165. Harris, supra note 5, at 40, 70-71.
166. Id. at 70.
167. Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Hearings on S.1722 and S.1723 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10603, 10604 (1979) (statement of Ira
M. Lowe).
168. See SENTENCING AND PROBATION, supra note 122, at 259. The fiction of "volunta-
rism" may also be dysfunctional in similar respects, to the extent that the general public
perceives giving offenders the freedom of choice to be an indication of leniency.
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making community service a distinct sentence as the British have
done, it may be that not only would authority to order it stand on
a sounder statutory basis, but also that service work would gain
wider acceptance as a punishment in its own right.169
A second risk inherent in allowing community service to de-
velop at the initiative and discretion of individual judges or pro-
gram administrators is that gross disparities are likely to arise in
the amount of service required of similarly situated offenders. In-
deed, indications from available program descriptions show that
such disparity is already present.17 0 The practice of community
service, however, is so new in most jurisdictions that the opportu-
nity to innovate in a rational manner exists in order to anticipate
disparity and minimize it from the outset rather than ignoring the
problem and later being pressed into defensive reactions to criti-
cism by researchers, politicians, and legal commentators. Just as, it
is advisable to attempt to develop explicit eligibility criteria to as-
sure consistency in deciding whether or not a particular offender
will be required to perform community service, it is vital that
guidelines be developed to instruct the decisionmaker as to how
much service will be ordered. 2
3. Service Type As indicated in column three of Table 1,
most of the community service statutes do not specify the precise
types of service that are to be performed. Instead, the vast major-
ity of the statutes refer to the type of work envisaged simply as
"public" or "community" service. Only occasionally are examples
given such as picking up litter in parks or maintenance of public
facilities. Similarly, only the statutes in Delaware, Illinois, Mary-
land, Minnesota, New Hampshire and New Jersey explicitly re-
quire that the community service be uncompensated.
Beyond general requirements that the community service
169. It would also help reduce the present unnecessary overburdening of probation of-
ficers by removing offenders from their caseloads who do not need probation services but
are given probation as a declaration that they are not "getting off free."
170. Harris, supra note 5. From her review of programs Harris concludes: "There is
little evidence that the introduction of new options is being used as an opportunity to make
sentencing practices more consistent or rational. Rather, the all-too-familiar signs of dispar-
ity are appearing with respect to community service sentences." Id. at 69. Similar risks ap-
pear at the revocation stage of service enforcement if no consistent standards are developed
to gauge successful or unacceptable performance levels.
171. For a discussion of eligibility criteria, see text accompanying notes 137-57 supra.
172. For a very lucid discussion of the general practice of empirical construction of
decisionmaking guidelines, see Gottfredson, et al., supra note 147.
[Vol. 29
COMMUNITY SERV. IN CRIM. LAW
work should be "reasonable" (Mississippi), or that it should foster
respect for interests violated by the offender's conduct (New
Hampshire), the statutes in Table 1 express no preference as to
how the type of service should be decided. While many proponents
of community service have stressed the idea that the punishment
should "fit the crime," none of the statutes listed in Table 1, with
the possible exception of the New Hampshire provision, suggests
that the type of community service need in any way be related to
the offense.173 Moreover, there is no indication in any of the stat-
utes reviewed as to whether attempts should be made to match the
type of service with the offender's particular skills, and whether
factors such as job location and convenience should be given any
weight, or whether the decision should be made on the basis of
random selection.1 74
Furthermore, in determining what is a "reasonable" type of
service, the Constitutional rights of the parties involved must be
considered. Commenting upon public service work as a condition
of probation, for example, a 1978 Illinois Attorney General's Opin-
ion concluded that "a probationer should not be assigned to work
for an organization whose religious nature or affiliations violate the
probationer's beliefs. Such an assignment might violate the guar-
antees of religious freedom in the United States and Illinois Con-
stitutions. 17 5 Although it seems likely that even the most unpleas-
ant and arduous tasks would not offend the cruel and unusual
standards of the Eighth Amendment, most practitioners exper-
ienced in community service dispositions adamantly oppose the
use of menial or degrading types of work as being contrary to the
constructive spirit of the sanction.17 6
Similarly, the individual's safety must be considered in impos-
ing a community service sentence. Services that pose a risk to the
safety of the offender or the recipient such as assigning an offender
with drug problems to work in a hospital, nursing home, or other
placement where narcotics are likely to be available, or requiring
an offender with alcohol problems to perform services involving
173. See Ohio statute, Table 1, supra, that links the service with the location at which
the offense occurred.
174. Advantages and disadvantages of each method of selecting the type of service are
presented in Harris, supra note 5, at 56-58.
175. 132 Op. AT'rY GEN. (IMI. 1978).
176. See, e.g., Brown supra note 8, at 9.
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driving an automobile or operating heavy machinery should be
avoided. 7 Although such illustrations may seem obvious at first
glance, they suggest that whoever is responsible for approving the
type of service to be performed also bears a sizeable responsibility
for checking the various conditions of the service and the of-
fender's background most carefully. Because of scope of the prob-
lem and because criminal justice information systems dealing with
an offender's prior record are so notoriously unreliable, .8 the most
glaring oversights are possible. In regions marked by heavily tran-
sient populations, the practice of many officials of only checking
local records may fail to uncover serious prior offenses or other in-
formation showing propensities that might make a particular
choice of service unwise.
4. Service Recipients Just as statutory guidance as to the
amount and types of permissible service is scant, examination, of
column five of Table 1 shows that many of the statutes either do
not specify who is to receive the service, or leave the matter to be
"designated by the court." The few statutes that do specify recipi-
ents, or locations for the intended service most commonly mention
state, county, and municipal governmental agencies, followed by
benevolent, charitable, or other private nonprofit organizations. 17 9
Services in particular communities are required in the New Hamp-
shire and Ohio laws; in the former, restricting the work to the city
or town in which the offense occurred, and in the latter to a town
or municipality reasonably near the offense or the offender's home.
The Maine statute allows offenders sentenced to jail to provide
voluntary services within the county in which the jail is located.
Whether or not specific recipients are included in the statute, the
general intent is that the work should not confer private benefits
upon individuals, except where such benefits are incidental to the
primary public benefit. 80
177. Harris, supra note 5, at 58, gives as an illustration placing an offender convicted of
child-molesting in a child-care agency. The greater danger would be, for example, in as-
signing an offender convicted of reckless driving to such an agency without knowing that the
offender also has a history of child molesting in other jurisdictions.
178. See, e.g., Chelimsky, The Need for Better Data to Support Crime Control Policy
(July 1976).
179. Some programs also use profitmaking agencies for assignment, but only to provide
services that would not otherwise be available such as visitation with residents of private
nursing homes. Harris, supra note 5, at 33.
180. This intent is explicitly spelled out in the Alaska Statute in Table 1, supra. See
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Very few of the statutes listed in Table 1 even fix the responsi-
bility for assuring that service recipients are available in sufficient
numbers to match the court's referrals. 181 In Illinois the develop-
ment and operation of "programs of reasonable public service
work" is listed among the duties of probation officers. In addition,
Illinois county boards are also authorized to establish and operate
agencies which, in turn, are to develop and supervise public service
programs for offenders; the programs are to be developed in coop-
eration with the circuit courts for the respective counties. Under
the Oklahoma statute the state's Department of Corrections is
made responsible for monitoring and administering restitution and
service programs. The most systematic approaches toward service
programming under any of the statutes reviewed are found in Del-
aware and Maryland. In Delaware, before an offender is assigned
to a project, the statute requires that work assignments are to be
submitted for certification at the approval of the state's Division of
Corrections. In Maryland, the Mayor of Baltimore and the execu-
tives for each county are authorized to require various sources to
provide work projects. Those agencies are responsible for supervis-
ing workers and are required to provide information about the
projects to the Clerks of Court, on a form prepared by the Admin-
istrative Office of the Courts; the items to be included in such a
form are not specified. The Maryland program is administered by
the Department of Parole and Probation (D.O.P.P.) which is re-
sponsible for establishing and enforcing general guidelines of the
program, although modifications are allowed to meet local condi-
tions. Counties may elect to have a local program monitored by the
D.O.P.P.; each county is required to report to the D.O.P.P. which
then files an annual report with the Administrative Office of the
Courts.
Even where administrative responsibilities and procedures for
selecting service recipients are indicated by the statutes listed in
Table 1, there remains an almost total lack of substantive criteria
upon which selection, and in the case of Delaware, certification,
must proceed. The Illinois statute gives more guidance than most,
simply by requiring that the programs "shall conform with any law
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.055 (Supp. 1980).
181. In states such as Arizona in which service may be designated by the court, but no
provision is made for developing programs, the responsibility presumably rests with the pro-
bation services or whatever other resources the court can muster.
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restricting the use of public service work. 1 2 Although the Mary-
land law requires guideline development, no indication is given in
the statute of the concerns that such guidelines should attempt to
meet.
If community service is to be an innovation that can be ac-
countable and tested against whatever its aims are stated to be in a
particular jurisdiction, and if sensible work assignments are to be
made consistent with those aims, minimum standards must obvi-
ously be devised for screening and monitoring potential service re-
cipients. The historical exploitation of prison contract labor by pri-
vate enterprises 83 is ample warning, for example, that service
recipients must be monitored for signs that paid employees are be-
ing displaced by community service workers. Other conditions for
approval of service recipients might include provisions for routine
monitoring, supervision and evaluation of the program and partici-
pant. Additionally, approval could depend on documentation of
the recipients' not-for-profit status, evaluation of its training and
supervision resources,'" and development of job descriptions that
include detailed information concerning skill levels and other fac-
tors to be considered in making particular assignments.
C. Tort Liability
One of the issues most frequently raised by program staff and
service recipients alike has been the question of liability coverage
for injuries to and by the offender during the course of the service
period. Liability for both third party injuries and harm to the of-
fender will vary from one jurisdiction to the next, depending upon
statutes regulating workers' compensation, governmental immu-
nity, and local tort practices. Consequently, criminal justice agents
and staffs of private community service programs are best advised
to seek assistance on specific liability and insurance issues from
the appropriate State or County Attorney's Offices. Several general
areas, however, must be considered.
If the offender is injured travelling to and from, or while par-
ticipating in community service activities, an immediate concern is
182. hL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 § 204a-l(b) (West Supp. 1980).
183. See generally 60 AM. Jun. 2D Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 34-40 (1972).
184. Programs also occasionally restrict eligibility to exclude religious organizations,
agencies that engage in partisan political activities, and fraternal or social groups with
limited membership. Harris, supra note 5, at 33.
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the expense of any medical treatment."' 5 Two major possibilities
exist for coverage. First, the defendant may be eligible for compen-
sation under a state's workers' compensation law. In a 1978 opin-
ion, for example, on the practice of Solano County judges placing
defendants on direct probation without sentence, conditioned upon
community service in lieu of jail or a fine,"' the Attorney General
of California concluded that:
The criminal defendant in such a situation would have the status of a "volun-
teer." Therefore, the county would not be liable for workers' compensation
since no employer-employee relationship could exist. The public entity or
charitable corporation for whom the volunteer worked would be liable for
workers' compensation if they adopted the appropriate resolution provided
for in sections 3361.5, 3363.5, 3363.6 or 3364.5 of the Labor Code. 187
In Massachusetts, by comparison, a 1980 Senate Bill provides,
in relevant part, that:
Any person, whether a juvenile or an adult, or the legal representative of such
person who is charged as a defendant with an offense or offenses against the
commonwealth may, if permitted by the court having jurisdiction of such of-
fense or offenses, consent to being placed on probation, with a stay of pro-
ceedings, a continuance without a finding or, after a finding by the court, a
condition of which probation being that said defendant performs certain
work or participates in certain community services for a stated period of
time.... Said defendant shall, while engaged in such performance or partic-
ipation, be considered an "employee" of the commonwealth, as defined in
section one of chapter one hundred and fifty-two [of the Workman's Com-
pensation section of the Labor and Industries Code], and entitled to all the
benefits of said chapter, and shall be entitled to compensation thereunder.'"
In the Hawaii and Illinois statutes listed in Table 1, however, it is
provided that the offender shall not be considered an employee for
any purpose.
Denying a community service worker the benefits of workers'
compensation, especially on the grounds of voluntarism, is a ques-
tionable practice. Reliance upon the voluntary nature of the of-
fender's participation to preclude compensation denies the reality
185. Lost wages from the offender's paid employment may also be involved; these will
usually be at least partially covered by his or her employer's routine disability insurance
policy.
186. This practice is independent of the petty theft community service provision in
CAL. PENAL CODE § 490.5(c) (West Supp. 1980), which is not covered by the Attorney Gen-
eral's Opinion. 61 Op. ATr'v GEN. 266 n.1 (Cal. 1978).
187. Id. at 266.
188. S.B. 873 amending MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 276 § 104.
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that most offenders are simply ordered to perform community ser-
vice by the court. In one sense, denying compensation for service
related injuries raises the specter of a double penalty: a policy of
imposing the expense of injury upon the defendant and the defen-
dant's family, when the injury is sustained in an effort to repair
the harm of the original offense, has little to commend it. As a
practical matter, placing the obligation to provide workers' com-
pensation upon the recipient agency may lead to reluctance on the
part of the agency to become involved. Such reluctance, however,
has not been a major impediment to recruiting service placement
to date:
In fact, about the only objection or question raised by any agency had to do
with its possible liability for workmen's compensation payments for work re-
lated injury to a probationer. The objection, however, was withdrawn when it
was pointed out that the free services of the probationer should much more
than offset any increase in premium for workmen's compensation insurance
to cover the probationer.18 '
A second source of compensation for injury to the offender is,
of course, private insurance purchased by the offender, his regular
employer, the program or the service agency. Ohio is unique among
the states listed in Table 1 in authorizing the court to require of-
fenders to pay a fee toward the cost of liability insurance. In addi-
tion, accident insurance for medical expenses, death, or dismem-
berment could be purchased on the offender's behalf by the
community service program, or by the service recipient. As with
worker's compensation the value of free labor to the recipient
should more than compensate for the insurance premiums in-
volved. And, if community service can operate as an alternative to
prison, the cost of premiums to the state should be a welcome re-
duction in expenditure over the cost of incarceration. Similarly, if
offenders in community service programs may legitimately be
classed as "volunteers," coverage is available through organizations
such as the "Volunteers Insurance Service Association," which was
formed to research available and feasible insurance relating to vol-
unteers, compile underwriting information, and design and admin-
ister insurance for volunteers. 190
Whether or not the offender is insured for injuries sustained
189. Brown, supra note 8, at 8.
190. "Insurance Program for Members of Volunteers Insurance Service Association"
(Corporate Insurance Management, 4200 Wisconsin Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016).
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during the course of a community service disposition, program ad-
ministrators and service recipients frequently express concern that
they may nevertheless be subject to an action for damages by the
offender. In response to a question about Solano County's poten-
tial liability of this kind, the California Attorney General's. opinion
states:
If such a criminal defendant is injured, and he is not covered by workers'
compensation, no liability could arise against the county unless the injury
was inflicted by an officer, employee or contractor of the county so as to give
rise to a cause of action under section 815 et seq. of the Government Code.
No facts have been presented which would indicate any such possibility.19 1
The Minnesota statute cited in Table 1, however, explicitly pro-
vides a mechanism for claims against the state for injury or death
of an offender performing uncompensated work or "work in resti-
tution". Under the Minnesota law, compensation for pain and suf-
fering is precluded, and the procedure provided is said to be "ex-
clusive of all other legal, equitable and statutory remedies against
the state, its political subdivisions, or any employees thereof.
19 2
And, although neither the California opinion nor the Minnesota
statute addresses the lingering issue of the liability of the private
community service recipient, it was faced squarely in a bill submit-
ted to the Massachusetts legislature at the beginning of 1980; after
providing that a defendant may "consent" to being placed on pro-
bation with a condition of community service, Senate Bill 873 adds
that:
Said defendant shall, at the time of his initial consent, waive in writing any
and all rights of action based on claims for personal injury or death arising
out of or in the course of said employment or participation, except his said
rights under said chapter one hundred and fifty-two [of the Workmen's Com-
pensation section of the Labor and Industries Code] granted herein, against
the court which granted said probation, the officers and personnel supervising
said probation, and the employer or community service organization for
whom or for which said defendant so worked or so participated. 193
Along with concern about injury to the community service
worker, program administrators and service recipients frequently
express fear that a third party injured by the offender will result in
an action for damages. Staff of community service programs report
191. 61 Op. Ar'y GEN., supra note 186, at 266.
192. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.739 (West 1979).
193. S.B. 873, supra note 188.
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that representatives of entire political subdivisions such as town-
ships or municipalities have refused to accept community service
workers, due to fear of third party personal injury or property
damage actions. Similarly, although less frequently, judges have
voiced concern about the political and personal undesirability of
being at the center of publicity surrounding such a suit, especially
if it is based on a new criminal offense by the service worker.19 4
From the standpoint of the offender and the private service
recipient the problem is defined by individual state tort law and
insurance practices.195 Of more general interest is the issue of stat-
utory immunity from tort liability of governmental employees and
officials. In Illinois, for example, liability of probation officers, their
employees, and state officials or employees acting in the course of
official duties, is limited by the community service statutes listed
in Table 1, except in the case of willful misconduct or gross negli-
gence, and governmental liability is precluded for the tortious acts
of any person placed on probation or supervision as a condition of
probation or supervision. In California, the Attorney General's
opinion on community service in Solano County concluded that:
If the criminal defendant were to inflict an injury upon a third person, the
county would be generally immune from liability either under section 820.2 of
the Government Code which grants immunity for the discretionary acts of its
"employees," or under section 845.8 of the Government Code relating to inju-
ries resulting from a decision to release or parole prisoners.196
The scope and rationale of California's governmental tort-im-
munity laws was recenty highlighted in the United States Supreme
Court case of Martinez v. California."" The case involved a claim
for damages against state officials responsible for the parole release
decision of a parolee who, five months after release, murdered the
15 year old daughter of the appellant. Prior to release, the parolee
had been serving a one-to-twenty year term for attempted rape for
which he had first been committed to a state mental hospital as a
"Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Not Amenable to Treatment."
The sentencing judge had recommended that the offender not be
paroled. In the action for damages the California trial judge sus-
194. Interviews with Circuit Court Judges, Multnomah County, Oregon (August 1978).
195. See generally Gurfein & Streff, Liability in Correctional Volunteer Programs:
Planning for Potential Problems, (ABA 1975).
196. 61 Op. ATr'Y GEN., supra note-186, at 266.
197. 444 U.S. 277 (Feb. 1980).
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tained a demurrer to the complaint and his order was upheld on
appeal. After the California Supreme Court denied appellant's pe-
tition for a hearing, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment. 98
The Martinez case is of interest to practitioners involved in
community service because of the particular purpose accepted as a
rationale basis for enacting absolute tort immunity statutes. In rul-
ing that the California immunity law did not violate the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment, Mr. Justice Stevens, de-
livering the opinion of a unanimous court, declared:
[T]he State's interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to
any discernible federal interest, except perhaps an interest in protecting the
individual citizen from state action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational.
We have no difficulty in accepting California's conclusion that there "is a
rational relationship between the State's purpose and the statute." In fash-
ioning state policy in a "practical and troublesome area" like this, the Cali-
fornia Legislature could reasonably conclude that judicial review of a parole
officer's decisions "would inevitably inhibit the exercise of discretion." That
inhibiting effect could impair the State's ability to implement a parole pro-
gram designed to promote rehabilitation of inmates as well as security
within prison walls by holding out a promise of potential rewards. Whether
one agrees or disagrees with California's decision to provide absolute immu-
nity for parole officials in a case of this kind, one cannot deny that it ration-
ally furthers a policy that reasonable lawmakers may favor. As federal judges,
we have no authority to pass judgment on the wisdom of the underlying pol-
icy determinations."'
Similarly, in the lower court Martinez opinion, the presiding judge
stated that:
There is no sure formula for the members [of the Adult Authority] to know
when a convict is rehabilitated and ready to re-enter society. Yet it is impor-
tant for the well-being of both society and the individual, to release persons
as soon as they are rehabilitated. It is to society's advantage to try a variety
of rehabilitative efforts and to use the maximum flexibility in facilitating
the individual's reentry into society. In order to accomplish these aims it is
necessary for public officials to make these decisions without fear they will
be liable if they are wrong.2 0
Despite the apparent sweep of the decision in Martinez, sev-
eral caveats apply. First, different state courts are free to deny
198. Id. at 559.
199. Id. at 557-58 (citations & footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
200. 85 Cal. App. 3d 430, 436-47, 149 Cal. Rptr. 519, 524 (1978) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
1980] 479
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
blanket immunity based upon competing reasons of public pol-
icy.20 1 Second, immunity for officers and employees may be waived
or not claimed by a government entity, thus removing the bar to
tort action.20 2 Third, although the complaint in Martinez also re-
ferred to a failure to supervise the parolee after his release, and a
failure to warn females in the area of potential danger, the litiga-
tion focused entirely on the original release decision; the individual
appellees were not alleged to have responsibility for post release
supervision of the parolee.20 3 As "ministerial" rather than "discre-
tionary" acts, however, both negligent failure to warn of dangerous
propensities and provide supervision have been held to fall outside
immunity statutes.20 ' Additionally, the Martinez decision explic-
itly reserves the question of what immunity, if any, could have
been claimed in an action under section 1983 of the Federal Civil
Rights Act if a constitutional violation had been made out by the
allegations. Making note that "the parole board was not aware that
appellants' decedent, as distinguished from the public at large,
faced any danger," the Martinez court held only "under the par-
ticular circumstances of this parole decision" that the girl's death
was "too remote a consequence of the parole officers' action to hold
them responsible under the federal civil rights law. 20
5
As community service is presently used mostly for minor non-
violent offenders, the issues raised by cases such as Martinez re-
main relatively academic. If community service is ever truly to be-
come an alternative to incarceration, however, and higher "risk"
offenders are admitted, the task of site selection and placement
will have to be approached, mindful of whether other persons at
201. See, e.g., Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d
1227 (1977) (members of State Board of Pardons and Paroles owe duty to individual mem-
bers of general public to avoid grossly negligent or reckless release of highly dangerous pris-
oner; public officials acting in other than true judicial proceedings do not have absolute
immunity in their discretionary functions).
202. See Gurfein & Streff, supra note 195, for a state by state presentation of variations
in tort claim procedures and exceptions to sovereign immunity.
203. 444 U.S. at 285.
204. See Semler v. Psychiatric Inst. of Wash., D.C., 538 F.2d 121 (1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 827 (1976) (under Virginia law, probation officer who had responsibility to see that
probationer was not released from confinement at psychiatric institute until court approval,
performed ministerial act when approving transfer to outpatient status without such ap-
proval, and was therefore not immune from liability for death of young girl killed by proba-
tioner while an outpatient).
205. 444 U.S. at 285.
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the site will face any potential danger, whether they must be
warned of the offender's propensities, and whether the placement
offers adequate supervision to avoid liability in the event that the
offender injures someone. An immediate problem exists because,
although there seems little doubt that the sentencing judge will
rarely, if ever, be held liable for exercising the discretion to place
an offender in community service placement,206 it appears that in
many instances the judge may actually know little or nothing
about the actual service placement2 07 and the decision on place-
ment is often made by a probation officer or community service
staff member, whose immunity from liability is often less secure.208
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The use of community service penalties in the United States,
influenced by the British experiences with Community Service Or-
ders and by the increasing use of financial restitution, seems likely
to grow rapidly in the near future. Infusion of large amounts of
federal funds to support service programs20 9 and endorsement by
prestigious organizations such as the American Bar Association 210
strongly support such a conclusion. Financial restitution programs,
moreover, are operating at every stage of the criminal justice sys-
tems, from pretrial diversion to parole. 1 Inevitably, community
service will follow; correctional authorities are being statutorily in-
structed to develop community alternatives to traditional incarcer-
ation,212 and community service is being performed by inmates
206. The question was raised hypothetically in the Martinez case by Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist, who asked counsel for the plaintiffs during oral argument: "What if the judge had
decided to grant probation to a rapist, rather than impose a sentence, and subsequently that
person commits another rape, should the judge be held liable?" Counsel responded that
perhaps he should. Martinez v. California, 441 U.S. 277 (1980).
207. See Brown, supra note 8, at 8 (at sentencing, judge imposes the work requirement
to be performed for such agency as is designated by the probation office).
208. Particular difficulties may arise where delegation of the service placement is an
abuse of discretion by the sentencing judge. Most of the statutes listed in Table 1, supra,
explicitly require that the service be specified or designated by the court. The Hawaii law,
by comparison, requires only that the extent of the service be so fixed. See also Harris,
supra note 5, at 41 (court usually does not describe specific assignments, leaving that to
program staff).
209. 43 FED. REG., supra note 9, at 32661-64.
210. See Harris, supra note 5.
211. See Harland, supra note 84.
212. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 20.315(1)(d) (West Supp. 1980).
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while still confined.2 i Services also are performed in some states as
conditions of pretrial diversion,214 temporary release,2 15 or special
leave.216
Overwhelmingly, the basis for current interest in the concept
of service penalties has been that it is an alternative to incarcera-
tion that may help to relieve present overcrowding and substan-
dard conditions of confinement. In his preface to a recent ABA
sponsored report on community service, for example, the chairman
of ABA's BASICS program (Bar Association Support to Improve
Correctional Services) declared that: "My own positive attitude
about community service sentencing may have been been summa-
rized by the British observer who. . . said, 'community service has
yet to prove that it is more effective but as an alternative to cus-
tody it is at least more humane as well as cheaper.' ",217
Additional support for expansion of community service penal-
ties, especially where they have developed in the absence of ex-
plicit legislative authorization, has been based on assumptions that
offenders voluntarily incur such penalties, and that the service ex-
perience is therapeutic or rehabilitative.21 8 The present discussion,
however, has examined each of these assumptions and expectations
and found them to be a frail foundation on which to base such a
significant departure from our present forms of punishment. Re-
sort to benevolently conceived and noble sounding euphemisms
has not been uncommon in the history of criminal and juvenile jus-
tice; the potentially nonbenevolent impact of optimistic self-decep-
tion is manifest in the enduring legacy of the adult "penitentiary"
and the juvenile "training center."219 Where untested rehabilitative
213. Inmates in Massachusetts Houses of Corrections (jails) were occasionally assigned,
for example, to stuff envelopes for charitable organizations while confined, as a condition of
participation in an LEAA funded restitution program. See Harland, Warren & Brown,
supra note 78.
214. OR. REV. STAT. § 135.891 (1977) (conditions of pretrial divetsion agreement may
include payment of restitution and/or performance of community service).
215. N.Y. CoRRc. LAW §§ 851, 855 (McKinney 1980) (temporary release of inmates to
community service program for not more than 14 hours per day for volunteer work).
216. GA. CODE ANN. § 77.342 (1980) (Commissioner of Offender Rehabilitation may au-
thorize special leave from penal institutions for participation in special community or other
meritorious programs).
217. Hughes, Preface to Harris, supra note 5, at vi.
218. See text accompanying notes 86-126 supra.
219. See P. MURPHY, OUR KINDLY PAR NT-THE STATE: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
AND How IT WORKS (1977); D. ROTHMAN, THE DIscoVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971).
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assumptions and the misleading jargon of "voluntary alternatives"
is relied upon to promote the extension of social control in the al-
most total absence of procedural and substantive rules, and, usu-
ally without direct statutory approval, the hard-learned lessons of
earlier innovations cannot be ignored. One such lesson in juvenile
justice has been noted by Mr. Justice Fortas: "Juvenile Court his-
tory has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however
benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for princi-
ple and procedure.*. .Departures from established principles of
due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure,
but in arbitrariness. ' ' 220 For a number of reasons, therefore, legal
developments in voluntary community service alternatives may
benefit from a frank recognition of their consonance with the con-
stitutionally sanctioned practice of involuntary penal servitude as
punishment for crime.
The first advantage of requiring statutory authorization for or-
ders of community service is that authority for punishing criminals
will be returned to a traditional statutory footing, rather than the
present "judicial legislation" upon which most community service
programming is currently based. Second, sanctioning community
service as a punishment would be reasonable grounds for removing
it from the avowedly nonpunitive rehabilitative umbrella of proba-
tion, allowing it to stand as a sentence in its own right.22 1 As a
result, it is to be hoped that the lack of guidance presently availa-
ble to criminal justice decisionmakers would be remedied through
legislative attention to issues of administrative detail, liability pro-
tection, procedural regularity, and substantive propriety, seeking
especially to reduce disparity in determining who is required to
serve, for how long, in what types of service, and for what types of
service agency.
In addition to the advantages of added specificity and visibil-
ity to be derived from removing community service from the condi-
tions of probation into the more visible and routinely recorded
context of an active sentence, a corollary benefit might be reduc-
tion in the present judicial practice of placing offenders on proba-
tion as a token punitive gesture for want of any other option.
220. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967).
221. This is not to imply that offenders sentenced to community service could not also
be placed on probation if some reason for probation services exists.
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Freed of caseloads consisting of absurd numbers of offenders many
of whom neither need nor could possibly receive more than the
most perfunctory supportive or supervisory attention, probation
officers might be in a better position to make a contribution that
would be more useful to their remaining clients and more re-
warding personally. This belief is strongly adhered to by the Brit-
ish who project that community service will have superseded pro-
bation as the most frequently imposed sanction by the end of
1980.222
Similarly, it is conceivable that even if community service is
not now used as an alternative to incarceration, it may achieve that
goal indirectly. By reducing probation caseloads to a level that of-
fenders now sentenced to custody might be released to intensive
probation supervision, or comparable community-based programs
because of the increased time availability on the part of probation
staff, community service may yet satisfy the primary goal of many
of its proponents. In the interim, community service could estab-
lish an identity as a punishment distinct from probation, and in
the process would be taken more seriously by the courts and com-
munity as a result.
A final advantage of requiring statutory authorization for com-
munity service is the greater likelihood that pressure on behalf of
the community service alternative could be brought to bear on leg-
islators to make policy decisions and to tackle the critical task of
making explicit the purposes and expectations behind the promo-
tion of community service sentencing. The importance of such
pressure, and the consequences of failing to apply it, are stated
clearly by Frankel:
[O]ur legislators have not done the most rudimentary job of enacting mean-
ingful sentencing "laws" when they have neglected even to sketch democrati-
cally determined statements of basic purpose. Left at large, wandering in
deserts of unchartered discretion, the judges suit their own value systems in-
sofar as they think about the problem at all.-
If the legislature determines that one aim of community ser-
vice is to supply an alternative to imprisonment, sentencing judges
will be justified in using it in that way. Adherence to such an ob-
jective, however, is neither easy to secure nor to measure. The
222. See note 138 supra.
223. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 7-8.
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British, for example, rejected several approaches, including a dec-
laration by judges that an offender sentenced to community service
would otherwise have been incarcerated, in the belief that judges
would almost inevitably rubberstamp such a declaration and find
ways around almost any procedure designed to compel them to
change their practices."2 4 An alternative strategy would involve the
use of an amended sentence procedure after an offender has al-
ready been sentenced to incarceration. 225 Even then, however, it is
possible that judges would quite quickly adapt their practices by
sentencing more offenders to incarceration for the shock value,
with the expectation that certain identifiable ones would be re-
turned for an amended sentence to community service.
One further approach to securing greater use of community
service as an alternative to incarceration would be to induce
greater involvement of defense attorneys in the preparation and
presentation of alternative proposals for their clients whom they
otherwise believe to be destined for imprisonment. This approach
has the advantage of reducing the need for judicial delegation of
service sentencing details to probation or program staffs, increas-
ing the likelihood that the service will be as "voluntary" as possi-
ble, and minimizing the likelihood that service will be advocated
where a less intrusive penalty already seems likely.
226
224. Remarks of George Pratt at ABA workshop, supra note 5.
225. Such a procedure is used by the PACT (Prisoner and Community Together) Com-
munity Service Restitution Program in Porter County, Indiana. (Interview with program
staff, June 1980) Under this program offenders are committed to jail by the sentencing
judge, but if the program decides to intervene the judge will entertain a request for release
on amended sentence to community service.
226. Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Hearings on S.1722 and S.1723 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10603, 10604 (1979) (statement of Ira
M. Lowe).
Section 2002(d): Lawyer's Duty to Present Alternative Proposals to
Incarceration.
1) Unless where prohibited in Section 2101, the defendant's lawyer has an obli-
gation to prepare and present to the Court specific concrete programs of non-
prison punishment. Such alternatives may include any combination of the dis-
cretionary conditions contained in Section 2103(b) (1-20), and such other condi-
tions as may be appropriate, regarding the individual characteristics of that de-
fendant, and of that offense.
2) This obligation in no way shall affect the lawyer's current role of allocation
of recommending probation or requesting a more lenient sentence in appropriate
cases.
Section 2002(e): Court's Obligation to Consider Alternatives Proposed.
1) Where a proposal has been submitted to the Court, in accordance with Sec-
1980]
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Finally, it must be emphasized that the foregoing analysis of
existing and potential dangers in the development of community
service penalties is not intended to discourage their refinement.
Norval Morris has stated that: "Optimism is an unfashionable in-
tellectual posture. Gloomy foreboding, buttressed by analytical
demolition of accepted doctrine is a surer path to academic reputa-
tion. ' 227 He might have added, however, that, in the long run, such
gloomy foreboding might also be a path toward more justifiable op-
timism when proffered and accepted in a constructive fashion.
Community service may ultimately achieve the diversionary goals
of many of its advocates; whether or not it does, it may still be-
come a useful rehabilitative or less incapacitative22 8 sentencing
provision; it may even save the system expenses in any number of
ways. It does represent in many ways a challenging opportunity to
approach an innovative sentencing option with all of the evaluative
and administrative advantages that recent advances in research
methodology and system technology can offer.2 29 With a history of
one criminal justice innovation after another producing counter-
productive and often inhumane side effects and unintended conse-
quences, the exciting opportunity to innovate also carries with it a
responsibility to do so cautiously and with a sensitivity to what has
gone before.
tion 2002(d)(1), the Court is obligated to consider such alternative proposals,
and to state in writing its reasons for rejecting any such proposal. Nothing in
this section shall prohibit the Court, or probation office from proposing its own
alternative plan of probation as provided in Section 2103, on its own initiative,
or from imposing any other sentence contained within this bill.
227. N. Moams, supra note 112, at 12.
228. In a recent interview a probation officer in Multnomah County, Oregon expressed
his support for requiring offenders to work for the following reason: "If [an offender's] work-
ing, he ain't stealing. At least not stealing much." Many of the other practitioners expressed
similar, if less eloquently stated, views. (August 1978).
229. See O'Leary, Editor's Comment, 17 J. OF RESEARCH IN CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 1
(1980) (noting increased sophistication of methodological technique in contemporary crimi-
nological research).
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